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Preface
Top management echelons in every sector of the business world
concern themselves with almost every activity in the organizations for
which they are responsible. The major and strategic marketing deci
sions, for example, are often felt to be too important to be left entirely
to the marketing manager. Similarly, strategic changes in product
lines, personnel policy, finance and new construction are reviewed at
the board or executive committee level. Senior executives do realize,
however, that they cannot immerse themselves in minute operating
detail and that they must delegate the day-to-day operating decisions.
But the determination of the company’s basic policies and response to
its environment is rightly the province of those who, as trustees for
the company’s shareholders, are responsible for its continued profit
ability.
One area in which management sometimes provides less long-term
guidance and direction than is desirable is inventory control. Profes
sional managers must be aware of the importance of inventory control,
if only in its cash flow or fund use aspects. Too often, however, man
agement seems to concern itself with what has already happened, i.e.,
asking why inventory levels have increased rather than providing
guidelines by which inventory policies may be determined. Manage
ment’s policy may then be characterized as reaction rather than plan
ning. From such a position, it is impossible for management to lay
down the decision rules on the basis of which inventory policy is to
operate.
Inventory polices do have considerable strategic significance. The
financing of increased stocks of parts or materials is a major use of
funds and a basic factor in working capital management. Fund
needs for inventory purposes competes with other uses of funds, and
may be the deciding factor in decisions concerning long-term fund
raising or the approval of new capital budget projects. A decision to
vii

adopt a “flat” rate of production where demand is seasonal and to
absorb the difference between production and sales by means of in
creased inventory will have great significance for the company’s per
sonnel and recruitment policies and for its public relations with the
local community. All these are matters of concern to the company’s
top planning and policy making group.
This is an area in which the CPA’s advice may be invaluable. He
can assist his corporate clients in two ways: by helping management
to identify the costs on which inventory policy must be based (to be
discussed further in this study), and, perhaps more important, by
bringing a fresh, “outside” approach to problems in this area and
identifying situations in which change is required but which have be
come accepted as part of the corporate environment. The most diffi
cult problem may be the establishment of criteria upon which inven
tory policy should be judged. The CPA who has a sound basic under
standing of the issues involved may render his clients valuable assist
ance in this area.
The purpose of this publication then is to highlight those issues and
to show, through the case studies which follow, how the CPA can
indeed help his clients.
This technical study has been prepared by Robert A. Farmer and
Associates, Inc., and Henry De Vos, CPA.
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*Practical Techniques and Policies
for Inventory Control
THE NATURE OF INVENTORY

The basic justification for having inventories is to introduce a degree
of flexibility into the manufacturing and merchandising operations.
If it were not for inventories, each operation would then be perfectly
synchronized with every other event: assembly parts, for instance,
would be received at the plant at the very instant that they are
required for assembly into the final product and that final product
itself would be completed on the very day that it is to be shipped to
the ultimate consumer. Clearly this is unworkable.
Inventories arise from a variety of circumstances and serve many
specific functions. They provide the flexibility required for rational
operational policies.
Transit Inventory

Wherever materials, work-in-process or finished goods have to be
moved between locations, those materials or goods are not immediately
available for further processing or sale. In effect, they are in temporary
storage. The volume of the inventory resulting from this fact is a
function of both the level of usage (or sales) and transit time. The
tim e taken to m ove work-in-process item s betw een operations in the

machine shop is very short, perhaps a few minutes at the most. The
transit inventory in this instance will probably be small, even at high
levels of production. (In-process items may be seen around the ma
chine shop in bins or on pallets for much longer periods but will, in
1

such cases, serve quite a different purpose from that of transit in
ventory.) On the other hand, transportation of finished goods from
the factory warehouse to distributor’s depots will probably be con
siderably longer. If that is in fact the case, the transit inventory will
be relatively large.
The creation of transit inventories is best demonstrated by a simple
mathematical example. Assume that a distributor sells 150 units of a
product per day, and that the transportation of this product from the
factory to the distributor requires four days. Clearly it is not prac
ticable for the distributor to wait until he has run out of stock before
ordering further supplies of the product. His policy should be to so
place his orders that some quantity of the product is always on its way
to him so that during fairly stable conditions and level demand the
amount in transit will be equal to the amount expected to be sold in
four days. Thus, if an average of recorded sales in recent periods
amounts to 150 units per day, the transit inventory should be:
4 X 150 = 600 units
The distributor’s daily stock record would appear as shown in Exhibit
1, below.
Two points of interest should be noted:
1. The distributor can not allow his inventory to reach zero. Orders
must be so timed that new supplies will be received one day before
the stock is depleted. This allows for a buffer or safety stock of 150
units. This will be discussed further in a later section.
Exhibit 1
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2. The distributor’s average inventory level should be equal to his
safety stock plus half the order size:
150 + 600/2 = 450 units
Up to this point it is assumed that the distributor believes that the
demand for his product in the immediate future will be the same as in
the previous period. The en route transit inventory therefore was the
amount necessary to replenish inventory at a constant level. If how
ever, there is reason to believe that the demand next period will be
greater than the last period, orders equal to the transit time multiplied
by the anticipated future demand rate with an additional quantity to
increase the size of buffer stock must be placed. Transit inventories
during periods where increased demand is experienced or expected,
therefore, will be greater than those during periods of level demand.
In-Process Inventory

In most manufacturing industries, in-process inventory is relatively
small, even where operations are on a large scale. A major automobile
assembly plant which assembles perhaps 2,000 vehicles each day, for
example, will have a limited in-process inventory because the timing
and scheduling of deliveries and operations is tightly controlled. Each
vehicle that leaves the final inspection line will have been constructed
of components delivered to the plant only a few hours earlier, and
the entire process is completed in less than a day.
A very different situation exists, however, in industries in which
there is an element of “maturing” in the process. An extreme example
is that of the wine industry, in which the volume of liquid undergoing
fermentation or aging becomes the largest element out of the total
investment in inventories. In such industries, financing in-process in
ventory often becomes the major use of funds provided by operations.
Organizational Inventory

Most production processes involve two or more distinct operations.
If the in-plant inventory consisted only of units actually being manu
factured at a certain moment (in-process inventory) and units being
moved between operations (transit inventory), then it would be neces
sary to synchronize each operation exactly with the preceding and
following operations. Where a single product is manufactured, this
3

could be difficult. Where two or more products are made utilizing
the same equipment, it could become quite impossible.
Suppose, for example, that a single product is being manufactured,
and that the production of the product involves two distinct opera
tions, “shaping” and “finishing.” Each unit of product requires seven
minutes “shaping” time and five minutes “finishing” time. It can
immediately be seen that with only one shaping machine and one
finishing machine it would be impossible to synchronize the two
machines exactly. The finishing machine would be idle for twosevenths of the working day. One solution would be to have seven
shaping machines and five finishing machines thus:
Shaping
(Seven Machines)

Finishing
(Five Machines)

Capacity:
1 unit every minute

1 unit every minute

Every five minutes the shaping group would produce five-sevenths of
seven units (five units), equal to the capacity of the finishing group.
It would then be a simple matter to synchronize the two. Such a solu
tion, obviously, is only practicable if the scale of production is suffi
ciently large to warrant the purchase of that many machines. Sup
pose, however, that a new product is added, and that each new unit
requires four minutes shaping time and two minutes finishing time,
using the same machines. The position is now:
Shaping
(Seven Machines)
Original product capacity:
1 unit per minute
New product capacity:
1¾ units per minute

Finishing
(Five Machines)

1 unit per minute
2 ½ units per minute

Under these conditions it will be impossible to synchronize the oper
ations when the new product is being produced unless some of the
finishing machines are shut down for part of the day.
The easiest way to avoid this problem is to allow an inventory of
shaped but unfinished parts to accumulate between the two processes.
4
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At some point in the shift, this inventory will reach a peak. When that
occurs, the shaping machines should be switched to another operation
while the finishing machines continue operations until the temporary
stockpile has been eliminated. Then the cycle will start over again.
This temporary stockpile has simplified management’s task by intro
ducing a degree of independence between the two stages and reducing
the coordination requirement. For this reason such inventory is called
“organizational” inventory. It is often referred to as “decoupling”
inventory.
Seasonal Inventory

In most instances the demand for a product is not evenly distributed
over the year: frequently there are one or two seasonal peaks of
demand with relatively slack seasons in between. Examples that are
often used are manufacturers of Christmas decorations, sporting goods,
outdoor leisure equipment, and certain gift items. A company pro
ducing these items could decide to match their output as closely as
possible with the demand cycle; this would result in high levels of
production during four or five months of the year in anticipation of
the seasonal peak demand and a much lower level thereafter. Under
such a policy there would be virtually no seasonal inventory. The
acceptance of such a policy, however, would entail the hiring and
training of new employees before every peak sales period, only to dis
miss them in slack periods. The costs associated with such fluctuations
may be very high. In that case, an alternative policy of maintaining a
level rate of production throughout the year is often adopted. This
allows for the accumulation of inventory during periods of slack de
mand and the reduction of inventory when demand reaches its peak.
The Sheldon Surfboard Company demonstrates this effect. Demand
for the company’s product, surfboards, is highly seasonal with a
marked sales peak in June and July. The past five years has conformed
approximately to the pattern shown in Exhibit 2, page 6.
Average monthly sales over the year are approximately 150 units,
but the entire year’s demand is concentrated within a seven-month
period, March through September. If the company attempted to match
production to the pattern of demand, it would be forced to close down
completely during part of each year. However, Sheldon Surfboard sets
its production at a level approximating the monthly mean demand of
150 units. Assuming that they begin their operating cycle in October
and that sales during the peak season consumed all but the 20 units
5

that remain in the factory warehouse at the end of September, Sheldon
Surfboard would then produce in anticipation for next year’s sales
substantially as shown in Exhibit 3, page 7. That figure shows the
relationship of production level, sales and finished-goods inventory in
the factory warehouse. It can be observed that the finished-goods
inventory has a marked seasonal peak immediately before the period
of peak demand. This in turn is drawn down almost to zero by the
end of the peak demand period in August and then commences to
build up again in anticipation of the next seasonal demand period. In
this way, production level is constant and the costs of seasonal hiring
and firing are avoided. These benefits are, however, reduced by the
cost of carrying or storing a seasonal inventory.
Batch Inventory

Under exceptional circumstances, the parts used in the fabrication
of a product may be ordered or produced one at a time; this could be
true for example in the construction of a major engineering project
such as a special purpose furnace, a conveyor system for bulk-minerals
handling, and so forth. But in normal circumstances and in most in
dustries, all parts and materials used are bought or made in batches.
The batch size may be determined by the practice of the trade, the
minimum order size for which quantity discounts are given, or trans
port considerations; for many materials a carload is the minimum prac
ticable quantity. The effect of these batch quantities is to produce a
temporary stockpile of parts from which production requirements are
drawn.
One of the basic materials used by the Sheldon Surfboard Company
is glass fibre matting used as a reinforcing medium in the moulded
Exhibit 2
500
400
Sates

Per

300

month
200
100
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Exhibit 3

fiberglass surfboards. The producers of this material refuse to supply
less than a carload lot at any one time. At a level of production rate
of 150 boards per month, this represents a five-week supply of glass
fibre matting. The inventory of this material over time will be as
shown in Exhibit 4, page 8.
Once again it will be observed that the supply is never allowed to
completely diminish. A reverse or “buffer” of one-week’s supply is
left on hand at all times. The average level of stock of this material
will be :
Batch size
Buffer +----------------2
= 1 + 5/2 = 3½ weeks’ supply.
7

Buffer or Safety Stocks

Safety stock has already been encountered in this study. The dis
tributor in the transit inventory example maintained a reserve of fin
ished units in excess of expected demand. The surfboard manufac
turer kept a reserve amounting to one week’s supply of materials on
hand. In these and all other cases, buffer stocks are a defense against
the unpredictable. For example, sales demand may differ from what
had been expected; delivery of the next batch of new material may be
delayed by a strike at the supplier’s plant or by the railroad. A typical
protection against such contingencies is to keep a reserve on hand
“just in case.” This form of inventory, then, takes into consideration
the element of uncertainty in most industrial activity.
An important point must be emphasized. The investment in buffer
stocks really amounts to purchasing safety, but safety is relative. The
decision to be faced is how much should be bought. The distributor
in an earlier example expected retail demand to be 150 units of product
per day, but by maintaining a buffer he acknowledged that he was
not certain. It will be remembered that the distributor could not re
ceive an additional supply in less than four days after placing his
order. By maintaining a safety stock of 150 units, the distributor was
in effect saying, “I expect demand to be 150 units a day, but I recog
nize that it could be as high as 150 + 150/4 or 187.5 units, per day.”
The distributor might have clarified his thoughts concerning this
matter by assessing the probabilities for the various possible levels of

Exhibit 4

Material
on hand,
in weeks
requirements
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demand, thus: “I guess there is about one chance in twenty that de
mand will be as high as 188 units a day.” If the distributor was asked
what chance there was of demand equaling 200 units a day he might
reply from experience, “Oh, around 1 in 100.” In other words, he
chose to invest in a safety stock which gave him protection against
being out of stock at the 95 per cent level of confidence. Had the dis
tributor chosen to cover the 1 in 100 situation, he would then gain the
protection of a level of confidence equaling 99 per cent.
This “trade-off” of degree of protection against the cost of obtaining
that protection is one of the basic policy decisions which management
must make in the field of inventory control. However, many of these
decisions are made unconsciously, or there is a failure to review such
decisions once made. The decision must be made deliberately and
reviewed in the light of experience. The CPA who does no more than
make his client aware that such trade-off decisions exist will have
rendered a valuable service.
DEVELOPING DECISION RULES
Relevant Costs in Inventory Control

The costs which bear directly upon the question of how much in
ventory to carry—and that must be considered in any answer to that
question—fall into three categories: the costs of ordering or producing
inventory, the costs of carrying inventory and the costs of being out
of stock. The development of relevant cost figures is one of the most
difficult aspects of inventory control. The costs required are not those
normally found in financial statements, and will not be immediately
available in organizations that have not previously employed formal
inventory controls. The company setting up control procedures for
the first time, or revising a long-obsolete system, is likely to rely
heavily upon the advice of its accounting advisors, and it is essential
that the CPA have a sound concept of what these relevant costs are.
The relevant costs are essentially incremental costs. They are not
concerned with sunk costs, nor with those costs that remain to be
liquidated in the fu tu re regardless of w hether a particular inventory
policy is adopted or not. A decision concerning whether a particular

inventory policy should be employed will be based upon the additional
costs of that policy, any costs which may be avoided by adopting that
policy, and the loss faced if the policy fails to provide all inventory
items when they are needed. The costs incremental to any one plan
9

should be considered not in the abstract but in relation to the costs
of alternative inventory policies. The inventory policy chosen should
be that policy which, on the basis of cost data, minimizes total rele
vant costs.
Costs of Ordering a Set-up: Batch Costs

Two distinct elements may be identified in the cost of all items
obtained for use in the company’s operations. These elements are
present whether a client chooses to buy the material from an outside
vendor or whether he produces the material himself. On the one hand
there are the costs which are usually referred to as “variable costs”
but which are fixed in terms of units procured such as the material
and direct labor content of items manufactured and the list price of
the items purchased. The remaining costs are those which do not have
a constant “per unit” relationship but are dependent upon the number
of orders placed or on batches of units produced. It is the latter costs
which must be considered in determining inventory policy.
These costs are normally referred to as “ordering” costs where items
are externally procurred and as “set-up” costs where items are pro
duced within the company. Both terms are oversimplifications. The
costs in each case are basically similar but have a number of distinct
elements as outlined below:
Externally Procured
Items
Cost of originating
purchase order
Clerical cost of receiving
the material in the
warehouse
Material handling in
warehouse
Shipping costs
Purchase discounts

Internally Manufactured
Items
Cost of originating work
order
Set-up cost
Jigs and dies
Material handling in plant
'Learning’ cost

The cost of the clerical work involved in the preparation of a pur
chase order is clearly an important factor in the total cost of placing
an order. It is also an example of a cost figure which may not be
readily available unless the company has instituted a clerical work
10
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study program. Some companies arrive at such a figure by dividing
the total operating expenses of the purchasing department, including
the salary of the manager, by the total number of orders placed. The
average order cost thus obtained, however, is not an incremental cost.
The cost required is the out-of-pocket cost of placing one additional
order, and even a very approximate estimate of it is likely to be less
misleading than an average cost which includes overhead expenses.
The cost of placing the order is not the only relevant cost. Other
costs which will be incurred in connection with every order and will
be largely independent of the size of the order include the clerical
content of the receiving department’s cost and, within broad limits,
the cost of physically handling the material received. Transportation
costs may be included in this category where, for example, it is neces
sary to send a vehicle to pick up the material whether the quantity
involved is 500 or 5,000 units. Finally, it will be necessary to take into
account quantity discounts which are not based on a constant “per
order” cost element but rather act as an encouragement to reduce the
number of orders placed. Quantity discounts are often an important
influence in determining inventory levels.
The most obvious element in the “per-batch” cost of items produced
within the company is the “set-up” cost: the labor involved in chang
ing machine settings, tool bits, dies and fixtures when changing from
a production run on one product to that on another. Here also, other
costs are relevant: the clerical cost of making out a work order card,
the cost of any extra jigs and fixtures required and the cost of material
handling services required between operations which again, within
broad limits, are independent of the batch size. Where the item under
consideration is not produced by the company, an important element
will be the “learning cost”; the cost of extra labor and spoilage which
will be incurred until operators have become familiar with the process.
Inventory Carrying Costs

Certain costs are incurred when inventory is carried in stock. Two
elements are of particular importance: the costs arising through “spoil
age” of stocks which are held for any length of time and the oppor
tunity cost or interest cost of the funds tied up. To these costs must
be added a charge for the space occupied by the inventory, whether
rented or owned, and the cost of insurance and taxes on that portion
of the property.
“Spoilage” costs include physical deterioration of perishable stocks
11

and losses through pilfering. A more important consideration in many
cases, however, is the danger of obsolescence. Such a cost is particu
larly difficult to assess, but in circumstances where it is a conceivable
threat, obsolescence is likely to be costly. The disposal of obsolete
inventory items is often at prices well below cost, or, in extreme cases,
it involves outright scrapping. Inventory decision rule policies which
do not take into account the dangers of obsolescence, and its possible
cost penalties, are far from optimal.
The derivation of the capital cost element in the cost of carrying
inventory is controversial. Some companies use the rate of interest at
which they can borrow funds as an inventory cost. Others use the
“opportunity” cost or the interest which the funds tied up in inventory
could earn if applied elsewhere in the company. The two methods
give widely differing answers: the borrowing rate is unlikely to be
more than 8 per cent whereas the opportunity rate may well be more
than 20 per cent. One solution would be to use the borrowing rate
when funds are plentiful and the opportunity-cost rate when funds
are scarce and must be allocated among competing needs. Beranek,1
in a recent book, offers a solution which seems more acceptable. He
suggests the use of the borrowing rate when specific borrowing has
been undertaken for the express purpose of financing inventory, with
a repayment schedule such that the average amount outstanding is
equal to average inventory; he recommends the opportunity cost rate
in those cases where this requirement is not met. If, for simplicity,
the CPA wishes to recommend to his client a single rate to be used in
all circumstances, then that rate should be the opportunity cost rate.
The Cost of Being Out of Stock

Here, again, there is a need to develop a cost figure not normally
produced by the existing accounting system. In order to do so, a
considerable degree of judgment will have to be used. Stockouts may
be experienced in raw materials and semi-finished inventories as well
as in finished goods. In the former cases the relevant costs will in
clude renumeration of operators temporarily idled by material short
ages and the incremental expenses arising from any rescheduling of
production required. If the stockout is in finished-goods inventory,
the first consideration to be faced is whether or not orders are likely
to be lost to competition. If this is the case, the relevant cost will be
1Beranek, Working Capital Management, Wadsworth, 1966.
12
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the contribution to profit foregone on the items not sold. It may be
argued that the real cost is considerably higher than this in that the
company’s relations with its customers may be damaged and future
orders lost. If, however, management believes that the unfilled orders
can be added to an order backlog and filled at a later date, the relevant
costs will be those of the extra clerical work, telephone calls, expedit
ing and, possibly, additional transportation expense.
How Much to Order or Produce

When the relative costs have been determined, they must then be
plotted to determine how total costs will vary under different in
ventory ordering policies. A formula can be introduced by which
optimum order or production batch quantities may be determined.
The Rawcliffe Company produces automobile accessories of various
kinds. A number of these accessories employ 3/16" machine screws,
and the company’s usage experience is 2,500 units per week or 125,000
per year. The cost of the screws, purchased in quantities of at least
5,000 is $4 per 1,000. The cost of placing an order for the screws is
$5, irrespective of the quantity ordered. The risk of obsolescence is
negligible, and the cost of storage has been estimated at $1 per 1,000
per year. The company’s rate of return on capital employed is 10
per cent per year. In the first instance it is assumed that stockouts are
not considered possible as demand can be forecasted with certainty.
The total costs of alternative inventory policies can then be calculated
as shown in Exhibit 5, page 14.
Clearly the first policy, ordering twice a year, involves lower total
costs than ordering a small quantity every two working weeks. The
optimum may or may not be somewhere between the two. Since it
would be highly inconvenient to have to perform such a calculation
for every possible ordering policy, the following formula is used to
indicate the optimum order quantity.2
QO=

2COR
I

w here Q O= O ptim um order quan tity
C O= Cost of placing an order

R = Annual usage
I = Inventory carrying cost per unit per year
2The formula assumes a relatively constant usage throughout the year.
13

This formula can be applied to the Rawcliffe Company’s problem as
follows:
QO=

2 X 5 X 125,000
.0014

= 29,880 units.

In other words, the company’s optimum order policy is to place an
order for a batch of 30,000 units when new supplies are required—
approximately every 12 weeks if usage is spread evenly over the year.
If total costs under this policy are calculated by the procedure used
in the table above, they will amount to $36 per year.
The method used to calculate the optimum batch size (length of
production ru n ) where the items are produced by the company rather
than purchased is essentially the same but requires a modification of
the formula to reflect the difference in average inventory. When com
ponents are purchased from outside vendors, the components are
normally delivered in a single batch ( equal to the order quantity, QO)
and this stock is then gradually depleted until another batch is re
ceived. Average inventory therefore amounts to one-half of the quan
tity ordered. When the component is produced, the plant stock de
pends upon both the rate at which the components are being proExhibit 5

Order Twice
a Year

Order Every
Second Week

125,000
2
62,500
31,250

125,000
25
5,000
2,500

$31.25
12.50

$2.50
1.00

Cost of placing orders ..................

$43.75
10.00

$3.50
125.00

Total cost: ..................................... ......

$53.75

$128.50

Policy:
Annual usage ................................ ......
No. of orders* ..............................
Order batch size ............................ ......
Average inventory Q /2 ................ ......
Carrying costs:
Storage cost ................................ ......
Capital cost ................................

* For the purpose of this table, a 50-week year is assumed, This assumption
will be maintained in the study.
14
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duced and the rate at which they are used in the final product. Aver
age inventory in these circumstances will be:
Q /2 X (1 -

R

where R is the annual usage rate as before and P is the annual produc
tion rate if the item were in continuous production. The optimum
batch size formula then becomes:3
2C R
Qp = .

R
I
P

C in this formula is the cost of setting up the machinery to produce
a particular component.
Assume, for example, the Rawcliffe Company has sufficient screw
cutting machine capacity to permit it to produce its requirements of
the 3/16" machine screws instead of buying them from outside sup
pliers, that the set-up cost is $5 and the rate at which the screws can
be produced is 375,000 per year. Using the above formula it is noted
that, by shifting from a policy of purchasing to one of internal pro
Qp =

2 X 5 X 125,000
125,000
.0014
1 375,000

= 36,660
duction of the screws, the optimum batch size increases from 30,000
to 37,000. This is not surprising because requirements are now pro
duced over a period of time rather than being received in a few large
consignments. This results in a lower average inventory which in turn
lowers the carrying cost. Further, the break-even point between the
cost of ordering versus the set-up and carrying cost has moved to a
higher figure.
It is now possible to calculate the optimum batch sizes for purchased
and internally produced parts. In many cases, a further saving in cleri
cal effort is possible. It will be observed that some of the cost figures
3See footnote 2, page 13.
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used are likely to be common to every calculation, particularly the
capital cost element in inventory carrying costs and the cost of placing
an order. If a slight oversimplification is accepted and the carrying
cost is treated as a percentage of the purchase price, a table of econo
mic order quantities can be constructed using the formula on page 13.
The batch size for subsequent items may then be read directly from
the table without further calculation. A further possibility is to con
struct a nomograph from which the batch sizes may be read. Discus
sion of the techniques used to construct such tables and nomographs
can be found in a number of standard texts on production and inven
tory control. Reference should be made to the bibliography at the
end of this study.
When to Order

The question of when additional material or components should be
ordered, unfortunately, cannot be answered simply by “when neces
sary.” Two complicating factors exist. First, when many hundreds or
thousands of items are in inventory, no single person can be expected
to remain aware of the stock levels of all items. Therefore, some kind
of system which will signal to management the fact that stocks of a
particular item are dangerously low must be devised. If perpetual
balances are not monitored daily, “review cycle” lead time will be re
quired. In addition, few items or materials are available immediately;
time must be allowed for processing an order, for transportation from
manufacturer to user, and perhaps for the fabrication of custom items.
There will be a time-lag, which is called “lead time,” between ordering
and receiving that item. The order must therefore be placed some
time before a stockout. An adequate reserve must be left on hand to
meet sales demands during the lead time. A further complicating
factor is that demand during the lead time will rarely be known with
certainty and will usually take the form of a probability distribution.
Three of the essential factors in the determination of inventory policy,
therefore, will be management’s estimate of lead time, of the usage or
demand likely to be experienced during this lead time, and the deci
sion as to the degree of protection required against stockouts—i.e.,
whether a limited possibility of a stockout is acceptable or whether the
company will try to achieve 100 per cent coverage of any possible de
mand.
The most frequently used inventory control mechanism is that
known as the “fixed order quantity system.” Under this system a pre
16
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determined quantity of stock, usually calculated on the basis of the
formulae introduced in the preceding section, is ordered whenever
inventory on hand falls to a particular level. The stock level at which
the “reorder” signal is generated is the “buffer stock.”
If demand during the lead-time period could be forecast with com
plete accuracy, it would be a simple task to calculate the necessary
buffer-stock level. Assume for example that the usage of the 3/16"
screws in the examples given earlier is completely predictable at 2,500
per week and that the screws were purchased from an outside vendor.
The time lag between ordering more screws and receiving them into
store was determined to be two weeks. The buffer stock would amount
to 5,000 units as follows:
Buffer stock = Lead time in periods X usage per period
= 2 X 2,500
= 5,000
Therefore, a new order for 30,000 units should be placed whenever
the inventory stock of screws falls to 5,000. The inventory of this item
will then follow the pattern shown in Exhibit 6, below, with new
orders being placed at point R in weeks 8 and 20.
Where usage during the lead time is not known with certainty,
calculation of a buffer stock level is considerably more difficult. Sup
pose that Rawcliffe Company’s schedule for the products in which
these screws are used is tied closely to new-car sales month by month
and is, therefore, highly variable and difficult to forecast. Manage
ment might state its position thus: “We expect to use around 2,500 of

Exhibit 6

level
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these screws per week. There is a one in ten chance, though, that
usage may be 3,500 and a one in 20 chance that it may be as high
as 4,500.”
The essential point to be made here is that the buffer stock will be
decided by a trade-off between protection and cost. If the possibility
of a stockout is completely unacceptable, then management will wish
to decide upon a rate of usage which in their opinion cannot possibly
be exceeded and will use that rate as the basis for a buffer stock.
Such a policy will give complete protection, but at a high cost in in
ventory carrying charges. More usually, management will decide that
some chance of running out of stock is acceptable. If the acceptable
chance is one in 20, then the buffer stock will be lead time in periods
multiplied by the estimated usage per period (2 X 4,500 or 9,000).
In statistical terms it could be said that a buffer stock of 9,000 will
provide protection at the 95 per cent confidence level, which means
simply that the odds are 19 in 20 in favor of having enough stock to
carry the company safely through the order lead time. A similar cal
culation will show that at the 90 per cent confidence level a buffer stock
of 7,000 would be indicated.
If the “buffer” has been set at a level which gives protection against
the one in ten chance of demand amounting to 3,500 units per week
during the lead time, then, whenever sales are close to the expected
( average) figure of 2,500, part of the buffer will still be on hand when
the stock replenishment is received. This reserve of 2,000 (one in ten
usage (3,500) times lead time (2) = 7,000 units; normal usage (2,500)
times lead time (2) — 5,000 units; safety stock = 2,000 units) units is
called the “safety stock” element of the buffer. The average inventory
will then be:
30,000
Q /2 + safety stock = ---------- 2,000 = 17,000
2
In circumstances where the possibility of running out of stock is
accepted, even at the one in 20 or one in 100 level, the quantity
formula should theoretically be modified to take into consideration the
cost of stockouts. This matter is treated in full in most textbooks on in
ventory control. The bibliography lists some of the texts that cover
this matter. The formula used in such instances is:
2COR
i + Cs
QO = --------x ----------

i
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In the above formula, Cs is the cost of one unit being out of stock for
one period of time. The net effect of applying this formula is an in
crease in the order quantity and an increase in average inventory—
resulting in an increase of inventory carrying cost. In most cases, how
ever, the difference is small. A major change in the indicated optimum
order size will arise only when the inventory carrying cost is very high
in relation to the cost of stockouts. In a majority of cases, the formula
on page 13 would be an acceptable approximation.
When both the order quantity and the reorder level (buffer stock)
have been calculated, a mechanism, must be set up which will indicate
when the stock of a particular item has fallen to the reorder point.
This may be accomplished by a physical system such as the two-bin
method, described in detail in the National Ventifan case later in this
study. Such a procedure is often used for low-cost items where stock
records can be eliminated. In a highly mechanized control system
where stock records are kept on computer tapes or discs files, it is a
simple matter to program the computer to print out “reorder” signals
as the predetermined level is reached. In most cases, however, stock
records are kept in a conventional card file system. In these situations
the record cards provide the reorder signal. Each card carries a nota
tion of the reorder level for that item. Whenever a stock clerk enters
a withdrawal on the card, he compares the new balance with this pre
determined level and institutes a reorder procedure if the balance is
equal to or less than the reorder point.
Two important points must be made. The first is that the stockcontrol staff must be convinced of the need for accurate record keep
ing and scrupulous observance of the reorder procedure. Every issue
of material from stock must immediately be recorded on the stock
cards. Periodic spot checks by management, in which a physical count
of a few items is taken to check the accuracy of the record cards, is
one way of imposing this discipline; but a better solution is to educate
stores and stock-keeping personnel to understand the importance of
accurate records and their role in the overall production-control sys
tem. Second, order quantities and reorder levels cannot be set once
and then forgotten. Constant review is required, and whenever a basic
change in demand levels becomes apparent, (as opposed to a short
term fluctuation), the quantities must be recalculated and new figures
must be entered in the record cards. The problems of recognizing
demand trends, forecasting future demand, and making adjustments
19

on a “smooth” basis will be considered in detail in Technical Study
Number 7.
SOME ADDITIONAL TECHNIQUES
A-B-C Analysis

The determination of inventory policy requires that management
make a series of trade-offs between conflicting sets of costs—i.e., be
tween the costs of ordering and the costs of holding inventory, be
tween the costs of holding safety stocks and the possible cost of run
ning out of stock. A further trade-off which must be made is that be
tween the benefits obtainable from an inventory policy and the costs
of administering the policy in terms of management time. A “near
optimum” policy, which requires less manpower to both set up and
maintain, is often more feasible than a fully optimum one.
The complete inventory of materials, parts, spares and maintenance
supplies for a medium-sized manufacturing company is likely to ac
count for many thousand separate items. Some of these will consist
of low value items. Others will be used infrequently so that the inven
tory turns over very slowly. A method of classification has been devel
oped using both unit value and stock turnover. This method is known
as “usage value analysis.” The unit value of each item is multiplied by
its usage over the past year or, preferably, its average usage over the
past three years; all inventory items are then grouped into classes
according to these “usage values.” Almost invariably, a small group
of items, between 5 and 10 per cent of the total items in inventory,
will be found to contribute 75 to 80 per cent of the total usage value.
Controlling these few items will generally account for 75 per cent or
more of the total dollar value of inventory used. The saving in man
agerial and clerical labor will also be very large.
Such systems are commonly known as A-B-C classification systems
because those that employ this method frequently use three classifica
tion groups. Type A items, the top 5 or 10 per cent by dollar value
of annual usage, are closely controlled, perhaps to the extent of re
evaluating their batch sizes and reorder levels every three months.
The next 25 to 50 per cent of the items, called type B, are subject to
less strict control: full inventory records are kept for these items but
quantities and reorder levels are reviewed less frequently. The re
maining items, type C, are regulated even less closely; perhaps, a
“two-bin” physical reorder control system might be used and stock
20
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cards eliminated entirely. For the smaller company, a two-classification system might prove more workable—an A classification indicating
items which are closely controlled and a B classification embracing all
other items.
The Fixed Order Cycle System

This procedure is an alternative solution to the problem of when to
order. The methods so far described involve a batch size which is
fixed between reviews and a reorder cycle which is flexible, depending
upon usage rates. The “fixed order cycle system” is the antithesis of
this, involving reordering at a fixed time but varying the reorder
quantity to bring inventory up to a predetermined maximum. If, for
instance, a particular item is reordered on a fixed ten-week cycle to a
maximum level of 500, the stock cycle for this item, assuming usage
of between 25 and 50 items per week, and a lead time of two weeks,
will be approximately as indicated in Exhibit 7, below.
It is apparent from the above diagram that the quantity ordered
in week 20 will be considerably larger than that ordered in week
ten because the rate of demand in the intervening period has increased.
The quantity ordered on each occasion will be an amount equal to the
normal usage during the two-week lead time plus whatever amount is
necessary to restore the inventory to its predetermined level of 500
units. This quantity of 500 units is, of course, management’s estimate

Exhibit 7

R = reorder
points

Weeks
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of the “normal” usage during the ten-week cycle plus an element of
safety stock.
The fixed order cycle system is sometimes advocated as a way of
reducing the cost of constantly reviewing inventory levels. Under the
fixed order quantity rule, it is argued, inventory levels must be kept
under constant and close supervision to ensure that new orders are
placed whenever any item is depleted to reorder level. The fixed
order cycle system therefore reduces the degree of supervision re
quired and the possibility of error by substituting a rigid pattern of
reorder or predetermined dates.
The development of the A-B-C classification system and the two-bin
method have considerably reduced the amount of close supervision
required under the fixed order quantity system, however, and the
fixed cycle system no longer has any significant advantage in this area.
The one situation in which the fixed order cycle may be preferable is
where a large number of different items are purchased from a single
vendor. In that case, considerable economies can be achieved by
ordering all such items on a single order form. These savings are only
achieved by scheduling all reorders for items purchased from the same
vendor to fall on the same day.
The fixed cycle system is, however, particularly dependent upon
accurate and up-to-date information feedback on usage and the de
velopment of new trends in usage patterns. If the usage of any one
item suddenly increases under the fixed order quantity system, that
item will simply be reordered more frequently because stock will fall
to the reorder point more rapidly. The only danger of a stockout will
be during the lead time. Under the fixed cycle system, however, a
large increase in usage could result in a stockout well before the re
order time is reached. Buffer stocks under the latter system must
therefore provide protection throughout the whole cycle, not just dur
ing the lead time, and the system must be considered more vulnerable.
It should be recommended with great reservation and only after very
thorough study of demand patterns.
Electronic Data Processing

Inventory control is an obvious possible application of electronic
data processing equipment, and most companies which have intro
duced computers into their operations have adopted some measure of
automation in their stock control procedures. The degree of sophisti
cation, however, varies considerably. Three distinct stages may be
22
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identified: mechanizing procedures previously performed manually,
performing additional operations which could not be performed man
ually, and, finally, using the computer as an adjunct to decision
making.
The first stage is a fairly predictable one. Inventory control systems
of the kinds already described, using formulas to determine order
sizes and establishing reorder points for all items, are largely automatic
in nature and call for relatively little discretion on the part of the
clerk. Such automatic actions may easily be performed by a com
puter. The card files, by means of which inventory records have been
kept, will be replaced by record files maintained on magnetic tape or
storage discs. Every withdrawal or receipt of stock will generate not
an entry on the record card but a punched card that is then fed into
the computer on a daily updating run. The program will include an
automatic comparison of the new balance with a stored reorder level
after every transaction, and a reorder list of all items which have fallen
to the reorder point will be printed-out after updating the run.
This phase should not be taken too literally. One of the major ad
vantages of installing a computer system is that it forces management
to review its established practices. Procedures may have to be stream
lined, redundancies should be eliminated, the information-flow im
proved, and a greater degree of coordination between different areas
and functions should be achieved. But the basic decision rules as to
when to order and how much to order remain unchanged at this time.
It must be stressed, however, that in many cases the stores clerks
will be doing more than performing a routine function. One of the
cases in this study, that of Laminated Plastics Company, describes
a situation in which the stores control staff performed a sophisticated
reordering procedure designed to reduce ordering costs where a num
ber of items were purchased from a common supplier. In that case,
the clerks employed considerable discretion in deciding how to sched
ule orders for internally produced parts. Most of these functions
could be transferred to the computer through the use of multiple re
order points. The important point is that the system study which is an
indispensable part of the computer feasibility survey must identify all
the functions being performed.
The second stage may be described as building-in a degree of
sophistication. At this stage the company begins to do things which
were simply not practical under a manual system. A good example of
this is the calculation of order quantities. In a manual system, this
can be done only at infrequent intervals. Where the A-B-C classifica
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tion system is used, the order quantities for class A items will be re
viewed more frequently, perhaps once a month. The computer’s speed
in performing routine calculations makes it quite possible to revise the
order quantity of every item after every transaction if management
believes such a policy would be desirable. Similarly, programs may
readily be written to update forecasts of future usage on the basis of
moving averages or smoothed trends of recent actual demand and the
results used to revise buffer-stock levels automatically at regular inter
vals. Any desired degree of “damping” may be built-in to avoid undue
variations in the parameters and to differentiate between long-term
trends and short-term fluctuations. Forecasting and trend-sensing
problems of this nature will be considered in Management Services
Technical Study Number 7 (to be published).
The final stage is that of simulation. In this phase the computer is
used not only to operate inventory decision rules but to evaluate them.
Programs can be written which reproduce as nearly as possible the
functions of the production-inventory system using existing decision
rules. Data is then fed into the model to simulate demand for an item.
For example, actual figures from some past period or a Monte-Carlo
type random-number generator may be used. The performance of the
system is then observed, the decision rules are modified where it
appears appropriate and the procedure is repeated. The use of simula
tion may avoid many costly mistakes. Simulation of inventory control
problems is still relatively rare. Interest in the whole subject of simu
lation is increasing rapidly. There can be little doubt that this tech
nique will play an increasingly important part in inventory control
during the next decade.
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The Topworth Toy Company
In October 1967, Richard Topley, founder and chief executive of
The Topworth Toy Company, met with his CPA, John Lewis, to dis
cuss his company’s performance during the year ended August 31,
1967. The recorded profit for the year was disappointing and had
been something of a shock to Topley. The situation may be summar
ized by his closing remarks to Mr. Lewis:
“John, this is the best year we have ever had in terms of sales. Our
sales revenue is an all-time record at $450,000. And yet we only made
$20,000 in profit. There is something wrong here. I think we run a
fairly low cost operation—we don’t buy a single piece of equipment
without a very good reason for doing so, and we have developed
skills in keeping our old machinery going that practically amounts to
genius. I pay myself a salary much lower than I could get by working
for somebody else. I’m sure there should be more of a profit in the
operation than a miserable $20,000. One of our problems, of course,
is that this business is so seasonal that for half the year we are lucky
to have any work on hand at all. Perhaps we should try to find a
completely different product.
“I know I procrastinated on your recommendations in the past, but
before we get deeply involved in another year, do you think you can
perform an investigation for us to determine what’s going wrong?”
Mr. Lewis promised to do some further analysis of the operating
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figures and to try to find the reason for the company’s poor profit
performance. He suggested another meeting in two weeks.
Background

The Topworth Toy Company was founded in 1955 by Mr. Topley.
The initial financing had been provided through his personal savings.
The venture proved successful and in 1961 further funds were pro
vided by a $250,000 debenture placed privately with a number of local
investors. Mr. Topley continued to own 100 per cent of the equity
interest in the company.
Topworth’s products were a range of “soft toys” selling at prices
between $2 and $3.50 each. These toys were stuffed, washable figures
of various animals. The outer “skins” of the animals were cut from
acrylic-pile materials or poly-vinyl chloride sheets. Stuffing materials
were either latex or plastic foam. The major operations consisted of
stamping out the basic shapes, seam sewing or heat welding, stuffing,
finishing and packaging. The direct labor content in this work was
high, only the stamping-out operation being fully mechanized.
Demand for Topworth Company’s products was highly seasonal,
with a peak demand occurring in October and November when retail
stores made their purchases for the Christmas season. The pattern of
sales during 1966 is indicated in the graph shown as Exhibit 1, page 28.
Sales were made directly to retail outlets or to the central purchasing
organizations of retail chains. The company employed two fulltime
salesmen. Mr. Topley also concerned himself directly in the sales ac
tivity, and the company’s longer-established customers expected to
deal with Topley in person rather than with a sales representative.
During most of the year, the Topworth products were produced only
to order. In the ten-week period, from early August to mid-October,
however, Topley tried to anticipate which lines would have the heav
iest demand and to produce some inventory ahead of orders. On the
whole, however, production levels followed demand very closely and
had the same seasonal peak. The monthly production figures ranged
from a low of 7,000 to a high of 30,000. One result of this fluctuation
was a considerable variation in the size of the direct production work
force. A regular full-time plant production head count of 15 to 19 men
was maintained. This was supplemented during the period of peak
demand by temporary and part-time labor. Therefore, as many as 80
production workers might be employed during the peak months of
27

Exhibit 1

September and October. The company went to two shifts during that
peak period and operated one shift during the remainder of the year.
The accounting functions performed by the Topworth staff con
sisted of little more than invoicing, maintaining customers’ and sup
pliers’ accounts, and preparing the company’s payroll. No formal cost
accounting system was employed although it had been recommended
on several occasions. Topley and the production superintendent priced
the products on the basis of their experience with the company’s
operations.
Lewis’ Study

After his meeting with Topley, Lewis spent considerable time think
ing about his client’s operations. He was convinced that Topley was
right in attributing his poor profit performance to the seasonal nature
of the business, but the lack of real cost information made it difficult
to see where the problem was. He decided that Topworth’s products
were so similar in nature and had such a small spread in selling price
that it would be reasonable to think in terms of an “average” unit of
product and to spread the total labor and materials costs over total
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production on that basis. This calculation produced the following
figures:
Total production (year ending
August 31, 1967) in units ...............................
Total direct labor (year ending
August 31, 1967) ................................. ..........
Average direct labor cost per unit ...................
Total direct materials (year
ending August 31, 1967) .............................

180,000
$153,000
$0.85
$ 81,000

Lewis was not surprised to find that the direct labor was a rela
tively large item in the cost of products of this nature. He wondered,
however, about the real labor cost. He was certain that Topworth
Company’s production policy was uneconomical and decided that the
most significant factors would be the cost of training a new labor force
every year, the cost penalty inherent in the relative inefficiency of
temporary workers, and the extra costs associated with the second
shift during the peak production period. It seemed, therefore, that
the possibility of introducing a new policy which would spread pro
duction evenly over the year and reduce the high labor turnover was
worth further study. Such a policy would mean, of course, that stocks
of finished items would be built up during the periods of low sales
volume and then run down during the period of pre-Christmas sales
demand.
The choice would be between the present system with its ineffi
cient use of labor and a system which would achieve labor efficiency
at the expense of carrying an inventory of finished goods. The costs
of holding such an inventory would be the deciding factor. Lewis
decided that this was the avenue he should propose to the Topworth
executives and he arranged to talk to Topley and his production
superintendent, Mr. Castaldi, on the following afternoon.
The Second Meeting

The next day, Lewis met with Topley and Mr. Castaldi in Topley’s
office. The following is excerpted from their conversation.
Mr. Lewis:

I am inclined to believe that a major part of your
present difficulty arises from your high direct labor
costs. The trouble is not so much that demand for
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your product is seasonal but that you have a seasonal
pattern of production. It seems to me that before you
start talking about looking for a different product you
should examine the possibility of smoothing out pro
duction by spreading it over the year and building up
stocks.
Mr. Topley:

Well, that is a possibility, and one that should be con
sidered, but I am not convinced that that is our answer.
I hope you can give me some figures. It seems to me
that we would tie up a lot of cash with that sort of
policy.

Mr. Lewis:

I only have some rough figures. This again points out
the importance of installing a cost accounting system
as I have recommended in the past. However, I hope
to have some better figures after I have cleared a few
points with you. I’d like to start by talking about the
temporary labor you hire every year. Can you give me
any idea how efficient these people are compared with
your full-time people and how long it takes to get them
up to their full productivity?

Mr. Castaldi: It’s hard to give you that in figures—we don’t have any
time standards here, you know. Let me put it this way:
in the first couple of weeks they are no help, even if
they have worked for us before. After that they start
to produce, but I guess they never turn out more than
75 per cent of the rate we get from the regulars. You
know, you put your finger on a real problem because
I’ll tell you—it’s getting worse each year. When we
started here, we didn’t have much trouble getting peo
ple for temporary work, but a lot of new industry has
moved in around here. We just don’t have the same
labor surplus to draw on. These days we take anybody
we can get, and it’s mostly women. The other problem
is that the job is getting more complicated, especially
with the new plastic materials we are using. You can’t
teach just anybody to use the new seam-welder in a
few days. We had a lot of waste this year!
Mr. Lewis:
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That seems to substantiate my suspicions, Dave. Now,
let’s see if we can estimate what this is costing you.
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According to your payroll records, the direct labor in
the past year came to about 61,000 man-hours. Of this,
32,000 man-hours was attributable to the regular
workers and the remaining 29,000 was work done by
temporaries. If we use Dave’s estimate and say that
these temporaries are about 75 per cent efficient com
pared with the regular workers after the first couple
of weeks and call it, say, 50 per cent in the first two
weeks, we g e t. . . hmm . . . it looks as if you are paying
for about 8,000 to 9,000 more man-hours than you
would if you had all regular labor—and at $2.50 per
hour, that is about $20,000.
Mr. Castaldi: And that doesn’t include the cost of the materials they
waste—or the time my foreman spends training them.
Mr. Topley:

As much as that? I guess we never have tried to figure
out what the temporaries were costing us. But what
about the other side of the picture?

Mr. Lewis:

Well, if you build up inventory, you have to store it,
and that ties up funds. Let’s set a flat rate of production
at 15,000 units a month. That figure is based on the
assumption that total sales next year will be about the
same as this year—180,000 units. I have drawn up a
graph (Exhibit 2, page 32) which shows what your
inventory levels would be at various points in a full
cycle of twelve months, starting with a nominal balance
of, say, 2,000 units after the Christmas sales, assuming
that the pattern of demand is pretty much the same
as last year.
You can see that finished-goods inventory rises to a
maximum of less than 40,000 units and begins to de
crease by July. In fact, it reaches a negative balance in
November and December. This indicates that a moder
ate amount of overtime would be required at that time
or else you will have a backlog order situation for a few
weeks. The average finished-goods inventory, taken
over the whole year, would be approximately 20,000
units, and it is on this figure that we need to calculate
inventory carrying costs. The direct cost per unit—the
actual out-of-pocket expense to the company—is $1.30,
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and on that basis you will be tying up $26,000 in extra
working capital. This would probably mean that some
additional cash would have to be obtained, but, in view
of this year’s sales figures and the economies that would
be realized, I don’t think there would be any difficulty
in getting the bank to provide a term loan to finance
this, especially since it perhaps could automatically be
liquidated during the peak sales season.”
Mr. Topley:

We may ask you to talk to the bank for us if we decide
to go ahead with this, but I don’t anticipate any trouble
there.

Mr. Lewis:

Of course—I’d be glad to do that.
Now, there is no question that the use of funds to
finance increased working capital will force you to
forego other opportunities. Therefore, no opportunity
costs are involved. So, the cost of these funds will be
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the rate of interest you would have to pay for them;
perhaps 6 per cent—which would be $1,560 per year.
W hat other costs should be considered? W hat danger
is there that some of the inventory items would be
obsolete before they were sold? And what about storage
space—do you have room for a maximum of 40,000
units in the plant or does it mean that you would have
to rent storage space?
Mr. Topley:

Very little danger of obsolescence—these are good
standard lines. We add a new one from time to time,
but rarely drop one. These are not really fashion items.
But storage space would be a problem. W hat do you
think, Dave?

Mr. Castaldi: I don’t think it would be difficult to find room to store
the products, though we will have to build a lockable
cage for security. We could take some of the space now
used to stockpile raw materials before the busy season.
If we are going to have that amount of inventory,
though, I’d want to have a full-time storeman and I
guess we should take his wages into consideration.
Mr. Topley:

I agree with that. Well, John, you have given us some
thing to think about. I need time to think about it
and check on a few of these figures. You have opened
up a range of possibilities: We could go halfway
towards your scheme, for instance, and spread our
production to some extent without removing the cyclical
effect altogether. Let’s discuss it again in a few days.

Results

Basing his decision on the estimates in Exhibit 3, page 34, Topley
decided to institute the policy suggested by his CPA.
Topworth Toy Company’s management decided to tell their CPA
that they had enough information under the circumstances to proceed
with implementing an inventory control system. As Mr. Topley put
it,
I see I should have taken your advice more seriously on past
recommendations. W hat we plan to do now is go ahead on our own;
however, if we run into any snags, I expect to call upon you to help
us. It’s not that I don’t want to pay your bills—for I fully expect you
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Exhibit 3

Economies offered by suggested level-production plan
Savings in direct labor ............................................... $20,000
Reduced scrap and offcuts .......................................
4,000
$24,000
Additional costs associated with proposed scheme
Interest charge on additional working capital ....... $ 1,600
Cost of storage sp ac e ..................................................
nil
Storeman’s salary ......................................................
5,000
Provision for pilfering and
spoilage (estimated) ..................................................
800
$ 7,400
Estimated net saving per a n n u m ....................................... $16,600

to charge me for your time on the matter—it’s just that I think we
should go over some of your past recommendations and see whether
we can use your services in another area first.”
The proposed change was later put into effect. The “level” produc
tion volume of 15,000 units per month was maintained by a regular
direct-labor force of 28 men, which was within the plant’s single-shift
capacity. Management estimated that some overtime would be re
quired later in the year, but that the overtime payments would be
more than covered by the savings of the extra shift bonus payments.
The change-over to the new system raised other problems for the
company. Production was no longer determined by orders received;
therefore, the question of how much should be produced and eco
nomical production run sizes has become important. The batch-size
problem was met through the use of an “economic lot size formula.”
Lewis is currently working with Mr. Castaldi to introduce a formula
into th e com pany’s operations. A second problem — th a t of deciding

what the total annual production volume should be—is and will remain
an important factor in the company’s planning. Instead of waiting
for orders, Topley is constantly anticipating changes in total demand
and making allowances for any long-term trends which develop, to
avoid being trapped into changing the production level on the basis
of short-term fluctuations in demand.
Management’s job has become more complex and demanding in the
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Top worth Company, but Topley is convinced that the financial rewards
will more than compensate for the extra care required. Lewis was
engaged to establish a cost accounting system which he was also
asked to implement. It is probably no exaggeration to say that the
change in inventory policy has introduced a new phase in this com
pany’s corporate development.
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The National Ventifan Company
In April 1968, George King, production control manager in The
National Ventifan Company, was considering a problem that had
arisen within his area of responsibility. On a number of occasions in
recent months, important orders had been delayed because parts
were not available. The most serious incident had taken place a week
ago. A valuable order for dust extraction fans for a newly constructed
chocolate candy plant had been delayed beyond the date set for con
tract completion because a necessary ball-race bearing was out of
stock. National Ventifan executives believed that an important cus
tomer had been lost because of this incident and the company presi
dent, Alan Barber, had made it clear to King that no further shortages
of this kind were to occur.
Background

National Ventifan was a medium-sized manufacturer of fans, blow
ers and general air-moving and dust-extraction equipment situated in
the Great Lakes region. The company was founded in the early 1920’s
and had, from its earliest years, found its major market in the regional
food-producing industries, particularly flour mills, chocolate producers,
bakeries and breweries. Sales growth had been rapid in the early
1950’s but had become progressively slower in the past decade. Sales
revenues for the financial year ended December 31, 1967 had been
$16,500,000, an increase of 2 per cent over the previous year and 5
per cent lower than the company’s “best-ever” year of 1966.
The company’s products covered a wide range of air-moving capac
ities and range from fairly small standard lines of ventilating fans for
warehouse use to large special-purpose dust-extraction “cyclone” units
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built according to a customer’s particular requirements. All models,
however, consist of the same basic components, electric motors and
associated electrical items such as: speed controls, fans and impellers
of varying degrees of complexity, spindles, drive shafts and bearings,
and sheet-metal castings and ducting.
National Ventifan’s plant facilities included a forge and an exten
sive pressing and sheet-metal working capacity. Most of the parts,
however, were purchased from outside vendors. Purchased parts in
cluded all motors and electrical equipment, bearings and such “stand
ard” items as screws, nuts, lock washers and bushings. The company
had a policy of offering servicing facilities and spare parts for all
models of current or recent production. Recent production was gen
erally interpreted to mean ten to fifteen years after the point of sale.
While this was the general interpretation, the company did maintain
spare parts for large volume products even though some of them had
been out of production for more than fifteen years. Management
believed that their spare parts and service policy played an important
part in building customer loyalty and regarded the provision of these
facilities as a basic company strategy.
In 1967, the company maintained inventories of more than 9,800
separate items. Of these, 6,500 were used in current production mod
els, almost half of which were also used in noncurrent models. An
other 2,000 items were held for use only on non-current models, and
the remaining 1,300 items were classed as maintenance items or con
sumable stores.
Perpetual inventory records were maintained in a series of ring
binders within which record cards could be inserted or removed as
desired. A separate record card was maintained for every item and,
at least in theory, they showed the number of items available and on
order at any given moment. All receipts and issues of the items were
recorded and a running total maintained. Similarly, orders placed
were recorded and the running “orders outstanding” was reduced by
the amount of new stock actually received. In addition to these run
ning totals of items on order and in stock, the record card carried a
listing of the s u p p lie rs ) from whom the item was available and a
recommended order batch size. This order quantity was established
when a part was ordered for the first time and was rarely, if ever,
revised. (A specimen inventory record card is reproduced as Exhibit
1, page 38.)
The company’s inventory-control staff consisted of the head store
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keeper, three storekeepers, and a clerical staff of six employees desig
nated as store clerks. Production or maintenance workers requiring
items from the storeroom made out requisition slips detailing the item
(by serial number), the quantity needed and the requesting depart
ment. The requisition slips were collected by the storekeepers and for
warded twice daily to the stores office where they were used by the
clerks to update record cards. Whenever a stores clerk, in recording
an issue, noticed that the level of remaining stock of that item ap
peared to be “dangerously” low in relation to recent usage of the item
(as recorded on the card), he would call this to the attention of the
head storekeeper. The head storekeeper would then look into the situa
tion, taking into account outstanding orders for the item which had
not yet been received from the supplier, and would decide whether
or not a further order should be placed.
Exhibit 1
STOCK RECORD CARD

F. 207

USED IN:

VENDOR (S):

A B C Mfg.

Current Production
Spares and Service
Plant Maintenance

250

ORDER QUANTITY:

ORDERS PLACED

VENDOR and
ORDER NO.

RECEIPTS AND ISSUES

QTY.

DATE

QTY.

DATE

BAL.

IDENTIFICATION

1066

2 50

7 /2 8 /6 5

2 50

9 /3 /6 5

250

Reed. A B C — 1066

ABC
1215

250

1 /1 2 /6 6

170

9 /1 2 /6 5

80

Dept. 3 -2 1 0 7

50

1 /1 0 /6 6

30

Dept. 1 -3 0 5 9

ABC
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King Considers the Problem

Mr. King was well aware that the system currently being used by
the company was open to serious criticism. He had devoted consider
able time to inquiring into the causes of recent “out of stock” situa
tions and had decided that two very important problems existed. In
some cases a clerk or the head storekeeper had made an error of judg
ment and the order for replacement items had not been placed in time.
In other cases, particularly where production of a particular model
was increasing rapidly, the replacement order had been placed when
indicated but the amount requisitioned had been too small. There
fore, the stock was virtually exhausted before the items were delivered.
Even where a further order had immediately been placed, a stock-out
had occurred before the second batch had been received. King also
felt that even where there were no incidents of a stock-out, unneces
sary clerical work in the stores office was contributing to the total
inefficiency because many small orders for the same item were placed
within a short period of time. He realized, in short, that firm decision
rules were required in order to answer the questions of when to place
an order and how much should be ordered at any one time.
Attempting to find a solution to these problems, King read a num
ber of articles on inventory control problems and was aware of the
existence of a number of formulas and “decision rules” which might
be of use to him. He wasn’t sure, however, whether or not it would be
possible to implement such procedures with his present staff, and
without completely disrupting the stores activity.
Questions

1. W hat techniques do you think may be useful to Mr. King in
solving the problem?
2. How can the magnitude of the clerical task be reduced?
3. W hat difficulties are likely to be encountered in implementing
your solution and how would you surmount them?
King Receives Some Advice

One day late in April, King lunched with the company’s president,
Alan Barber, and the conversation turned to the problem of making
certain that an adequate supply of production parts was available.
King told Barber that he was considering the introduction of new
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inventory control decision rules, and of his uncertainty about the diffi
culties likely to arise in implementing the changeover. Barber agreed
that a real problem existed and made a suggestion. He said that the
company’s independent auditors, a long-established local CPA firm,
had an established management services department offering general
consulting services to their clients. Perhaps they can be called upon to
lead us out of our stock-out problems, Barber suggested. “It might be
worth getting in touch with them and seeing what they are able to
suggest.”
A few days later, Barber and King met with the head of the account
ing firm’s management services department, Harry Smiley. Mr. Smiley
had worked with the firm for a few years after qualifying as a CPA
and had then been given leave to attend a two-year M.B.A. program
at a graduate school of business. He had been given the job of setting
up the management services activity on his return from the program
in mid-1964 and now had two assistants, one of whom accompanied
him to the meeting.
King opened the meeting by describing the problems the company
had encountered—and stating his own position. The following dis
cussion ensued:
Mr. King:

I know that there is a rational approach to these prob
lems. I realize that we are wrong in using reorder quan
tities established years ago and probably never revised,
even though our annual usage now might be much
higher than it was when the quantity was established.
I am aware that we can use a formula that will tell us
how large our order quantities should be, on the basis
of our ordering costs and annual usage, and that we
should recalculate the quantity every time we have a
significant change in usage levels. I know that we should
establish reorder points for each item on the basis of the
supplier’s lead time. But the size of the job is terrific.
Look, we have over 9,000 different items. T h at m eans

working out 9,000 economic order quantities. That’s a
huge task, even if it is a fairly simple calculation. Then,
even when we have the quantities established, we have
to continually review our usage. Seems as if I’ll need
twice as many store clerks to keep up with all this.
Mr. Smiley: Well, it would be a big job to apply that sort of system
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to every item of inventory, but you may not have to.
The first thing that should be decided is how many items
need to be kept under a tight control.
Mr. King:

You mean that we should apply the system only to cur
rent production parts and not to service or maintenance
parts? I’ve thought of that possibility but it still leaves
over 6,000 items and that is still a big job.

Mr. Smiley: No, that isn’t what I had in mind. You should start by
finding out what items really figure significantly in your
operations. The cost of some items may be very nom
inal, and even if usage on those items is high, you may
be able to play safe by keeping a large inventory without
tying up cash. Other items may be of a high value but
are not used very often. The critical items are those
that are both fairly expensive and have heavy usage.
Now if it is possible to multiply usage by the cost per
item, a usage value figure for every part can be devel
oped. Then the usage-value figures can be used to classi
fy the parts as a basis for inventory control methods.
Mr. King:

That seems to make sense. To what extent would it
simplify our problems? Can these classifications be set
to determine how many items we should control closely,
or what?

Mr. Smiley: The classifications you use are entirely up to you. I
would expect to find, though, that about 10 per cent of
the parts account for at least 75 per cent of the total
usage value, and these are the ones you should exercise
close control over and revise frequently. Those items we
commonly call class “A” items. Then, if you agree, we
could divide the remainder into two categories. For the
“B” items you would use the same decision rules as the
“A” items but with a less frequent review of usage rates
and less frequent revision of order quantities. For the
“C” items you might do away with stock records alto
gether and use a physical control system.
Mr. Barber: You mean the old two-bin method?
Mr. Smiley: Right. The two-bin method can save you a lot of clerical
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work as long as you don’t apply it to everything. You
reduce the number of items for which economic order
quantities have to be calculated, thereby reducing the
number of items requiring close continuous control. You
will still have to calculate reorder points for all items on
the basis of lead time. But the running total records are
eliminated altogether on some items, which results in a
considerable saving of clerical routine.
Mr. Barber: Where do we go from here? Can you help us?
Mr. Smiley: Certainly, we can help. I would suggest that my assist
ant, Bob, spend some time with your stores people ex
plaining the idea of usage value to them. We’ll want a
usage value figure for every item. I’d appreciate it if
you could introduce Bob to them, and make sure they
realize that he is trying to help them and is not about to
put them out of a job. Also, you could have your people
start collecting the other information we need. We’ll
want an annual usage figure for every part but that is
readily available from the record cards. We will need
to know the lead time for each part. We will also have
to determine how much it costs to hold inventory, in
cluding both the warehousing and cost of the funds tied
up in inventory. Bob will keep me informed of progress
and we’ll get together again when we have the figures
available.
Al, it would also be a good idea to free up George, or
his assistant, to work with Bob on this study. You will
then be able to carry on with the system once it is in
operation.
I will verify our discussions with an engagement letter
as soon as I get back to the office. Roughly the job
should take us about four months requiring about 50
m an-days by our staff. T he cost will probably be in the

neighborhood of $8,500 plus expenses.
Mr. Barber: Harry, if this does the job, it will be well worth the cost.
I have a feeling that our stock-outs have already cost us
at least three times that in customer relations. Let’s get
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on this matter as soon as possible. I’ll let our boys know
that I’m backing this project 100 per cent and that I
have assigned George and his assistant to work with you.
Making the Survey

During the next six weeks Smiley’s assistant, Bob Scott, and Venti
fan’s stores-control staff completed a usage-value analysis of all items
in the company’s inventory. As a first step, Mr. Scott took a random
sample of 1,000 inventory items and performed a usage-value analysis
on the sampled items. This analysis provided a result that conformed
fairly close to Mr. Smiley’s prediction in that 10 per cent of the sample
items accounted for 84 per cent of the total sampled usage value. A
similar analysis was then performed on the entire inventory.
The calculation of the usage values was not a purely mechanical
one. Considerable discretion was needed in deciding what figures to
employ for the “annual usage” factor. In most instances, however, the
record card indicated that usage during the past year had been abnor
mally high or low. It was decided that an average figure taken over
the past three years should be used in those circumstances.
The completed usage-value analysis was tabulated on the basis of
cumulative percentages of total inventory items and their respective
cumulative percentages of total usage-value. This tabulation is repro
duced as Exhibit 2, below.
Exhibit 2

Cumulative Percentage
of Items
10%
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100

Number
of Items
986
1,972
2,958
3,944
4,930
5,916
6,902
7,888
8,874
9,860

Cumulative Percentage
of Total Usage-Value
74%
82
88
94
96
97
98
99
100
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It will be observed that 90 per cent of the total number of items
accounted for 100 per cent of the total usage-value. This was attribu
ted to the fact that some items were found to have had zero usage
during the past three years, and, therefore, contributed nothing to the
sum of usage values. In other words, virtually ten per cent of the items
being carried in inventory were no longer used and had not been used
for three years.
Establishing the cost of placing an order was another matter requir
ing considerable judgment. The Ventifan Company had never availed
themselves of clerical time studies and had no predetermined time
standards available.
Barber concurred that the cost of ordering should include the clerical
task of originating an order form, and that some provision should also
be made for the clerical content of the receiving and handling proce
dures that were involved. After some discussion, management decided
that an amount of $10 adequately covered the various cost elements
involved.
After considerable thought, management decided not to include
any allowance for the cost of the storage space required to store the
inventory. Mr. Barber argued that the company did not rent any
storage space: all inventory was held in the in-plant storage facility,
a building constructed twenty-five years ago. The revised inventory
procedures were not expected to increase the absolute level of parts
inventories and he hoped that the elimination of the “no-usage” items
would in fact reduce the space required. He believed therefore, that
there was no real “opportunity cost” or out-of-pocket expense involved,
and that it would not be appropriate to include the cost per square
foot of space used in the calculation.
On the question of the cost of funds used to finance inventories, it
was decided to consult Mr. Barth, the controller. Smiley had explained
to Barth that either the cost of borrowing funds, or an appropriate
opportunity cost rate (in the form of the company’s normal rate of
return on funds employed), might be used, and that, while he himself
favored the latter, there was no definite general agreement as to which
method was the “correct” method. In Barth’s opinion the significant
factor in this case was the company’s overall financial position. Man
agement did not wish to increase their debt structure at the present
time and was unwilling to approach their banking connections for
loans in view of the past year’s disappointing sales and profitability
record. Mr. Barber had given explicit instructions that the inventory
problem was to be solved without increasing the funds tied up in in
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ventories. The approach consistent with this policy seemed to be the
use of an opportunity cost rate, and suggested that the company’s
current rate of return on investment, 10.5 per cent, be used.
Designing and Implementing the New System

Early in August 1968, Barber and King met with Smiley and Bob
Scott to decide what should be done on the basis of the information
now available. They agreed that all items which had shown no usage
during the past three years should be reviewed and, possibly, elimi
nated. It was understood that exceptions might have to be made for
certain items: primarily spare parts for company machine-tools held in
the maintenance department and the consumable stores storeroom.
The majority of the more than 900 no-usage items were spares for
long-obsolete company products. It was proposed that these items
should no longer be made available from stock. In the unlikely event
that further orders were received for such items, they would be spe
cially ordered, since it was not reasonable for customers to expect all
parts for such equipment to be available from stock.
It was readily agreed that the usage-value classification should be
used as the basis for the new control system, but there was some dis
cussion as to whether a two- or a three-category system was most
appropriate. Barber finally decided that he would prefer to use a twocategory system initially, and then possibly go to a three-category sys
tem later. He explained his decision thus:
“Harry, you said that there’s no point in going to a three-category
A-B-C system unless we are going to make a real difference between
the way we treat the B and C items. I think that makes sense. I also
think it might be a grave mistake to change too many things at once.
The changeover to the order-quantity formula is a big step in itself,
and it will be a while before we are familiar with it. We have to get
use to the routine of reviewing the “A” item usage levels frequently,
and we still have the problem of setting reorder levels for everything.
I like the idea of doing away with the stock records for low usagevalue items and using physical controls, but it would be a pretty radical
step for us. Maybe we’ll be ready to take that step about a year from
now, but I’d like to wait until we are more familiar with the system.”
The major task remaining was to establish reorder points for all items
to be retained in inventory. The company’s representatives on the
project team were made to realize that the basic principle was to
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obtain a reliable estimate of the suppliers’ lead time for each item and
to set the reorder point at such a level that the stock on hand when
the order was placed was adequate to satisfy normal usage require
ments during this lead time. This task was time-consuming but the
necessary information existed within the company. The stores foreman
and his staff already had extensive experience with the time taken to
obtain the most important items; additional verification was obtained
by consulting the company’s purchasing office or by comparing the
dates upon which orders were placed and received as recorded on
the inventory record cards.
The concept of safety stocks was more difficult to put across. King
did know that it was good practice to build-in some additional stock
as a safeguard against unusual demand during the lead-time period.
However, he had no idea of how to determine the size of the buffer
stock. Again, Mr. Smiley was able to clarify the problem. He stated:
“There is no clear rule on this, George. Buffer stocks are a way of
buying protection against abnormal stock use. The more protection
you want, the more you have to pay for it in the form of increased in
ventory with its associated holding costs. I can’t tell you how much
protection to buy; only you and your colleagues in the company can
decide that.
“I would make two suggestions, though. First, you don’t have to
use the same degree of protection for all items. You might consider
whether any particular group or class of items is more likely to result
in holding up important contracts and use a greater degree of pro
tection for those items than you would for all inventory in general.
Second, in deciding where to set the level for any item, ask yourself
'what chance of running out of stock am I willing to accept: One
chance in ten? in 20? in 100’? Then, if the answer is, say, 'one chance
in 20’, decide what level of demand during the lead time has one
chance in 20 of actually happening and set your reserve stock and order
point on this basis. A statistician would probably call this buying pro
tection to a 95 per cent confidence level, but I think it is easier to
understand it in my terms.”

Results

Implementation of the first phase of the reorganization was com
pleted by the end of August 1967. The policy committee approved the
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elimination of the zero-usage items, and 740 items were removed from
inventory, leaving a total of 9,120 items.
That Mr. Barber was pleased with the results of the system can be
determined from the concluding remarks that he made to colleagues
at the local Chamber of Commerce meeting.
“We have placed our inventory control procedures on a rational
basis, and I am much happier about the whole procedure. Moreover,
we have been able to do this without any increase in the overall size
of the inventories. We will not know the exact effect until we tally
the inventory prior to our audit in a couple of months from now, but
right now I would guess that the overall parts inventory has been
reduced by about $70,000 and there are more savings to come. We
have found that we were holding stock amounting to eight or nine
years usage on some of the older items and we are slowly getting them
down to reasonable levels.
“Best of all, we seem to have licked the stock-out problem. We did
have a stock-out problem on one item awhile back on a line for which
we had not yet established the safety stock and order quantity levels.
Since then we haven’t had a stock-out problem.
“There is still a great deal to do. I’m still not sure that all our safety
stocks are correct; I guess we’ll have to review them continuously. I
am thinking of introducing a “C” category some time and using
physical controls, but not immediately.
“All this has taken up quite a bit of my production control manager’s
time, but I think it has been worthwhile. We now have our purchased
parts well under control. The next step is to apply this order-quantity
formula idea to some of the parts we make in the plant, particularly
the sheet-metal ducting where it is common to two or more models,
and see what we can achieve there.
“Fellows, I think it was the best investment we have ever made.”
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Laminated Plastics Company
The management of Laminated Plastics Company was, in late 1966,
engaged in a study to determine whether or not the company should
purchase an electronic computer and what economies and advantages
might be expected if such a step were to be taken. The possible appli
cations being considered included payroll, sales order processing and
customer records, and the control of materials and finished-goods in
ventories. This case, however, is primarily concerned with the inven
tory control aspects of that study.
The company had, in the earlier stages of its inquiry, considered
machines produced by a number of computer manufacturers. Each
had been invited to submit estimates of the equipment required and
its approximate cost (or rental) on the basis of a general description
of the nature and volume of the applications being considered. A
single manufacturer had then been selected, on the basis both of the
cost of equipment and of the considerable experience of comparable
applications in other companies in the plastics industry. Laminated
Plastics Company’s staff and representatives of the manufacturer,
General Automation, were, in September 1966, working together on
an in-depth study of the operating efficiencies obtainable. On the
basis of this study, Laminated Plastics would ultimately decide on
whether or not to place a firm order for the data processing equipment.
Background

The Laminated Plastics Company was a medium-sized producer of
a wide range of consumer and household plastic products and of plastic
components for the electrical and automotive industries. Sales during
the year ended June 31, 1966 amounted to $25,000,000. The corpora48
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tion employed 1,200 people in three plants in the southern New Eng
land area.
The operations performed by the company included, typically,
resin-mixing, impregnating, cutting, finishing and assembly operations.
The company produced both finished consumer and household items,
such as electrical fittings, and plastic components for the electrical
and automotive industries. An example of a component produced for
incorporation into products of other companies was the range of
circuit-boards sold to manufacturers of radio equipment, portable tape
recorders, and so forth. Approximately 60 per cent of the corporation’s
production was in final-use consumer items, and 40 per cent in “indus
trial” sales. The industrial production was predominantly in non
standard components made to customers’ designs, although a number
of standard lines were offered. In 1966 the product range included
more than 800 consumer items and 300 different standard industrial
items. Approximately 500 different custom industrial items had been
produced to order during the previous twelve months.
Inventory Control in Laminated Plastics

Responsibility for inventory control was vested in the three plant
“production control” managers. Each production control manager was
directly responsible to his plant manager and functionally responsible
to the company production and operations planning manager, Barney
Fisher. Procedures and decision rules to be used in setting and con
trolling inventory levels were determined by Mr. Fisher and his staff
and standardized throughout the company although in practice the
plant production control managers were allowed to use considerable
discretion in the implementing of procedures.
A stores-control activity, consisting of a supervisor and ten to twelve
clerks and storemen, was located in each plant. Each supervisor was
responsible for both raw-materials inventories and for finished-goods
inventories where appropriate. Management estimated that the storescontrol staff spent approximately 35 per cent of their time in con
trolling raw materials and purchased parts used in the company’s
products and 65 per cent in controlling finished-goods inventory.
No company product was made in more than one of the three plants,
and there were, therefore, no items common to two or more of the
finished-goods stores. All plants did use similar raw materials. The
raw material, and, to a lesser degree, purchased parts were stocked at
all three plants. Some interplant transfer of components did take place.
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For example, laminated pressings produced by one plant were some
times used in a more complex product assembled elsewhere. The
volume of such transfers, however, was small. The plants were not
treated as separate profit centers.
Inventory records at each plant were kept on Kardex card files.
The information maintained on the card for each item included a rec
ord of monthly total usage (raw material) or sales (finished goods),
running total balance on hand, and a record of all issues and receipts
of stock and orders placed. The information used in updating the cards
was obtained from stores issues, from consignment notes and from re
ceiving documents. Thus, at least in theory, the Kardex system pro
vided an accurate and timely record of both the raw materials and
components and the finished-goods inventories.
The standard inventory control procedures that were developed
included the use of an economic lot size formula and a modified fixedorder-quantity reordering procedure. A definite reorder quantity or
lot size which had been calculated for every item was recorded on a
Kardex file card for that item, as was the reorder-point stock level.
These reorder levels had been calculated on the basis of suppliers’ or
manufacturers’ lead time and on the recorded consumption or sales of
the item; a reserve stock element was included as protection against
abnormally heavy demand during the reorder period. Whenever a
stock clerk recorded an issue of raw materials or parts to production
or a consignment of finished goods from stock, he entered the new
running balance on the card and then compared it with the reorder
level. If the balance on hand was equal to or lower than this level, a
reordering procedure was initiated.
The clerks did not in all circumstances observe this set of decision
rules, however. In many cases, a number of different materials were
purchased from the same supplier, and transport and handling costs
could be reduced considerably if some or all of these items were or
dered at the same time. Similarly, in the case of company-produced
items, setup costs could have been minimized by scheduling a number
of related items together. To achieve these savings, a stores clerk who
found that a particular item had fallen to its reorder point would
examine the position of related items, i.e., items bought from the same
source or produced on the same equipment. If any of these items were
found to be “close” to their reorder points, they would be added to
the order being placed. No definition of “close” was attempted: the
clerk used his own judgment.
The company production and operations planning office had also
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developed and instituted a follow-up procedure on orders placed. All
replenishment orders, whether for purchased parts and materials or
for company-manufactured parts, were recorded in an order control
file as well as on the Kardex record cards. One stores clerk in each
plant was responsible for reviewing all orders shown to be outstanding
on the order-control file at weekly or, where necessary, daily intervals.
If warranted, the clerk carried out expediting procedures by telephon
ing vendors, in the case of purchased parts, and by using the produc
tion control department expediters in the case of company-made parts.
The exact timing and degree of emphasis used in the expediting pro
cedures were left to the discretion of the stores-control staff.
The company production and operations planning manager, Mr.
Fisher, did not believe that the Laminated Plastics inventory control
procedures were perfect. Emergencies did occur at times—usually
because items which were shown on the stock cards as having ade
quate stock were found to have lower physical stocks. ( Such incidents
were ascribed to pilfering or to the stores control copy of the stock
issue slip failing to reach the control office.) A further problem was
the deterioration of raw materials in the store. Stock handlers were
instructed to use a “first-in, first-out” procedure but did not always do
so. On the whole, though, Fisher was well satisfied with the system in
use, and doubted that any major improvement was possible.
Suggested Computer Applications

Heading the team of general automation staff members working
with Laminated Plastics in the computer applications study was Miles
Stevenson, a senior methods analyst. Stevenson was convinced that
the computer could be used to perform most of the inventory-control
functions currently undertaken by the stores control clerks. He had
worked on sales-installation teams with other customers who had de
cided to use their computers for inventory control among other func
tions, and he saw nothing in Laminated Plastics’ case which would
prevent an equally successful installation.
He met with considerable opposition, however, from the plant pro
duction-control m anagers and stores-control supervisors w ho argued

that their tasks were far from routine and mechanical in nature and
could never be satisfactorily undertaken by a machine. Stevenson
discussed the problem with Mr. Fisher, and found him willing to give
any suggestions serious consideration. But, Fisher’s basic attitude was
one of skepticism, and Stevenson realized that he would be extremely
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difficult to convince. The following exchange summarizes their re
spective positions at this time:
Mr. Fisher:

You’ll have to produce some good arguments to make
me go along with you on this, Miles. I think we have
a good system working here; we have evolved it over
a number of years and most of the “bugs” have been
worked out of it. We have a good team who have
learned their jobs the hard way and know how to
handle most of the problems as they come up. We
give them working rules for guidance, but they use a
lot of common sense in interpreting them. As I under
stand it, to put the problem onto your machine you’ll
have to reduce it to a set of rules to be followed in
prescribed circumstances. Those rules will have to
cover every possible situation, because the computer
can’t use judgment. Well, I don’t think it can be done.

Mr. Stevenson: I have been getting the same argument from your
plant people, so let me see if I can answer it for you.
You are right when you say that the machine will only
work according to the rules we build into the program,
but those rules can be pretty sophisticated. The ques
tion is, how much of the “discretionary” activity your
people perform can be reduced to a set of rules ( even
though the rules may be much more complicated than
simply “Order when stock on hand falls to 250” or
something of the sort). On the basis of past experi
ence, I’d say that most of it can. The other point to
bear in mind is the information flow we can build into
the system; we'll be able to give you an analysis of
usage, outstanding orders or anything else you want
simply by building in sub-routines to do this after
the daily updating run.
Mr. Fisher:
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That sounds impressive but I don’t believe that I need
any more information than I get now. Our records
are as comprehensive and up to date as we can make
them, depending only on the accuracy of the docu
ments we use to update them—and, remember, this
is a limitation your computer is going to share. I can
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get any sales or consumption analysis I want from the
cards, and we already have outstanding-order files.
The cards are a flexible system, too—if we want to put
additional information on them about a particular part
or supplier, we can do so. No, I doubt if you could
produce any useful analysis that I don’t now get and
you might turn out pages of stuff that I won’t even
read. Sorry, but I’m still not convinced.
Questions

1. Do you think that Laminated Plastics should transfer its inven
tory control to the computer? Why?
2. If you feel that further study is required, to what areas would
you direct the study? Who should undertake it?
3. If you do not believe that the use of a computer is practicable in
this company, can you suggest any way of improving the existing
manual system?

Finalizing the System

Study of the potential uses of the computer in Laminated Plastics
Company continued throughout 1966, and agreement on the specifica
tions of the system was reached in February 1967.
During this period, Stevenson and his team had many more talks
with Fisher and the production control staff. The final decision was
that a mixed manual-automatic system of inventory control would be
introduced. Fisher had withdrawn slightly from his previous position
on the use of automatic inventory control; possibly, some pressure had
been brought to bear on him by the president and other members of
the senior management team. As the decision to purchase the com
puter had now been made, management was determined that the
equipment would be fully utilized. Even more important, the com
pany controller and his staff were convinced that major improvements
in certain accounting functions might be achieved if the inventory
control records could be combined with certain accounting and costcontrol records to provide a unified order-financing and stock-control
system. This view was supported by Robert Spencer, a partner in the
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established Connecticut CPA firm which serviced Laminated Plastics
in an advisory capacity. The controller later described his motives
for consulting Mr. Spencer as follows:
“By October of 1966, I was beginning to worry about the decision
we were to make. I suppose every company considering a change of
this magnitude has a similar problem. We knew our old system pretty
well. We knew also that it could be improved in many areas, but the
changes the General Automation people were suggesting seemed
pretty radical. Well, I wanted a second opinion.
“I am not suggesting that the manufacturer’s team would deliber
ately mislead us, but they are all computer enthusiasts—they have an
emotional commitment to their machine. Also, they don’t know our
operations as well as we do and might discount things that look trivial
but could become major problems. We have a lot of faith in this
particular CPA firm: they are familiar with our operation and they
keep up to date on management techniques. So we decided to call
them in.”
During the next few weeks, Spencer worked closely with the Gen
eral Automation and Laminated Plastics teams and occasionally acted
as mediator between the two, particularly in the area of inventory
control. He knew that many of Fisher’s reservations were justified and
that certain inventory control functions would be performed less effi
ciently if transferred to the computer. But, being in a better position
than Fisher to look at the overall needs of the company rather than
those of a single functional area, he recognized the advantages of an
integrated system of the kind suggested by Mr. Stevenson. As Fisher
had considerable respect for Spencer’s judgment, the development of
the mixed-system inventory control proposals was greatly facilitated
by that CPA’s involvement.
It had been apparent since the beginning of the study that the
order financing and accounts receivable systems being planned could
be effectively operated only on a system giving random access to key
file information, and the specifications of the equipment ordered in
cluded a disc-type random access storage unit. To obtain the full
benefit of such a unit, the systems team argued that it would be neces
sary to maintain the finished-goods inventory on random access disc
file. The final step after receipt of an order for stock products, for
instance, would be to use the random-access facility to ensure that
54

LAMINATED PLASTICS COMPANY

adequate stock was available. Under the existing manual system,
this check was made by the order-processing clerk telephoning the
appropriate stock-control clerk, who answered the query by refer
ence to the card-file record. By including certain additional in
formation with the finished-goods inventory records on the randomaccess unit, it would be possible to use the file in the preparation of
a number of accounting reports. It was decided that selling price
and standard cost would be included in each item’s file record. By
multiplying the quantity ordered by the stored selling price for each
item, the value of an order could thus be automatically calculated and
used for invoicing purposes. A subroutine could later be developed
which would accumulate these order dollar values by salesman identi
fication code to provide a basis for the evaluation and compensation
of the sales staff. The total sales to date for any item could auto
matically be multiplied by its standard cost to give a running total
cost of goods sold. Finally, it was decided that the file record for each
item in finished goods should include its weight and cubic capacity,
so that the total weight and volume of every order could automatically
be calculated as a guide to its delivery routing.
In order to achieve these benefits it would, of course, be necessary
to centralize the finished-goods stock records, which under the manual
system were kept in three separate files in the three plants. But the
control staff argued that they required frequent access to these rec
ords. The system team responded that the automatic checking of stock
availability for orders received would eliminate most of the queries
they were required to answer and that the file updating program
would print out a daily list of stock items which had fallen to their
reorder levels. The few remaining instances in which a store clerk
required an immediate check on the inventory status of any item might
be met by a visual inspection of the appropriate stores location—i.e.,
a physical check. An agreement was reached that there would be a
trial period during which the old and new systems would be run in
parallel. The master finished-goods file would be built up on the
random access unit in the computer section at company headquarters,
which was located at the largest plant. The Kardex finished-goods
files would continue to be maintained in all three plants, however.
Only when all parties were satisfied that the system was working satis
factorily and that the programs had been fully tested would the final
changeover be made and the Kardex files discontinued. As a further
safeguard against the loss of the finished-goods inventory record by
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machine malfunction, it was agreed that a “father and son” file proc
essing technique would be used. This means that a copy of the entire
file would be made each day before the updating run was started. In
the event of a malfunction, it would then be possible to read back the
file as it stood before updating and repeat the run.
One of the provisions of the mixed auto-manual system was that al
though the finished-goods records would be maintained by the com
puter the reordering decisions would not be automated. This had been
arrived at after considerable discussion. Stevenson and his team had
proposed routines which would perform some of the “discretionary”
work of the clerks. Where a group of parts was purchased from a single
vendor, and shipping economies might be achieved by ordering all at
the same time, it was suggested that the part numbering system be
modified to give all parts in the group a common suffix. When one
such part reached its reorder level, the program would call into mem
ory all other parts in the group. Each parts file record would include a
“supplementary” or “secondary” reorder level, and orders would be
placed for those parts which had fallen to these levels. Similarly, it
was suggested that the follow-up function on outstanding orders might
be automated by specifying an “emergency action” level (somewhat
below the reorder level), and using a subroutine to print out a list of
all parts which had fallen to “emergency” levels after each updating
run. Fisher and the plant production control managers held that, at
best, this system would only simulate the work of an inexperienced
stores control clerk—that it would never be able to exert judgment and
flexibility of which an experienced man was capable, and that it
offered no advantages over the manual system. Spencer agreed with
this view, and it was decided that the computer system should be con
fined to file updating and the printing out of a list of stocks that had
reached reorder level with all further action being taken by stores
clerks in a reorganized central finished-goods stock control office. The
computer would also be used to print out the list of related items as
described above, but the decision as to whether or not to order would
be made by the clerks.
Both the General Automation team and Laminated Plastics believed
that there would be little advantage in automating the raw-materials
and production-parts stock records. Pressing reasons existed for re
taining these records in the plants for use in production-scheduling
activities. One of the few advantages of a centralized and automated
system in this area would have been the ready valuation of raw-ma
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terials inventories; management considered this a trivial matter com
pared with the arguments against centralization. It was decided, there
fore, that no change would be made in this area.
Considerable attention was given to the problems of material de
terioration in storage and it was found that this was essentially a ma
terials handling problem. The existing store layout made it very diffi
cult in many cases to obtain access to the earliest dated batches of
materials without first moving the more recent batches. This problem
was answered by a revised stores layout giving two-sided access to
all storage locations and increased storage in cage pallets.
Results and Conclusions

The implementation of the new inventory-control system was started
in May 1967. By July the transferring of finished-goods records onto
the computer was completed, though manual records continued to be
maintained. These manual records were discontinued in January 1968.
Raw-materials inventory records are still maintained on the manual
system. Early in 1968 Mr. Fisher expressed his opinion on the per
formance of the new system in the following terms:
“We now have a fair degree of operating experience with the new
system and I am reasonably satisfied with it. The system we did finally
install was a common sense compromise. I hate to think what might
have happened if we had gone along with some of the ideas the com
puter boys came up with in the early stages. They sure tried to re
move the human element in our inventory control decisions. We now
have the computer doing what it does best: routine updating of rec
ords and printing out of stock reports.
“I can’t say that we have had any great benefits from the system in
the pure inventory-control area. We certainly haven’t been able to
reduce our clerical costs, but we never really expected to. Both the
General Automation people and Mr. Spencer emphasized that we
should not expect to justify the computer in terms of labor savings.
We do produce a number of reports and statistics faster than we ever
have before, but that benefits the controller’s area much more than it
does mine. From my point of view I suppose the biggest benefit we
got out of the whole operation was the shake-up. The pressure—I
guess you could even say the threat—forced us to look at everything
we do, why we do it, what rules we use and what the limitations of
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those rules are. This scrutiny produced quite a few side benefits. We
found out what was going wrong with our FIFO inventory procedure,
for instance.
“Obviously the results of the changeover have to be judged by the
benefits to the company as a whole. In the inventory control area the
gains were relatively small because we were already well organized.
Ironically, though, we would have gotten more benefit from the
shake-up if we had been less efficient in the past. The real benefit is
the extent to which the finished-goods control function has been inte
grated with other company activities. We’re now a step closer to the
total integrated management control system that the management
specialists keep talking about.
“One thing is certain: we don’t have anything like an ultimate sys
tem. We are already thinking of taking another look at the raw-ma
terials inventories and seeing if we can’t make some use of all the
sales analysis information we now produce to anticipate our rawmaterials replenishment needs—now, that would be a radical change
from anything we have done in the past.”
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Allen Appliances, Inc.
“This information is a complete surprise to us. We have always
assumed that the pattern of retail sales was pretty close to the demand
pattern as it reaches us from our distributors. This is the first time
we have had any real data about retail sales, and it appears to be
way out of line. I don’t know yet what is going on here, but I am
surely going to try to find out. I have a feeling that these figures may
be the key to our production problems.”
The speaker, Ray Miller, was the production control manager of
Allen Appliances. He had been appointed to this position fifteen
months previously after some years in the production planning activity
of a heavy engineering company. Two months after his appointment,
Miller had asked the marketing manager, David Hillstrom, to cooper
ate in a survey of the company’s retail outlets. All retailers were asked
to maintain a record of their dollar volume of sales of Allen products
during each month of 1966. In January 1967, Miller had just re
ceived the last of these figures, and was in possession of a complete
schedule of month-by-month retail sales for a whole year. No such
survey had previously been undertaken by the company. The pattern
of sales revealed in these figures was very different from the assump
tions that Allen management had previously held about the sales of
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their products, and Miller was trying to understand the significance
of the data now in front of him.
Background

Allen Appliance Company was a small manufacturer of household
utensils, situated in an industrial area of northern New Jersey. The
company’s products were predominantly metal fabrications and in
cluded such items as can openers, aluminum pans, storage containers
and wire-mesh sieves. Almost two hundred separate items were pro
duced in the company’s one plant.
Sales during the financial year ended December 31, 1967 were
slightly more than $2,000,000, which was the highest dollar sales
volume in the company’s history and represented a 5.5 per cent in
crease over the previous year. Sales had increased in each of the
previous four years at rates varying between 3 and 5 per cent per year.
The pattern of sales was highly seasonal with a single peak in Novem
ber and December of each year and a marked low in June and July.
Allen products were sold to ten independent distributors situated
in the eastern and southeastern states. These distributors differed
little in size, and sold the products of a number of other manufacturers,
some of which were in direct competition with those of the Allen
Company. They supplied approximately two hundred retail outlets.
Most of the retail outlets were independent hardware stores. Each
distributor maintained a small sales force that called upon the retail
outlets approximately once every two weeks to solicit orders. These
orders were filled from the distributors’ inventories and delivered,
usually by their vehicles, three to eight days after the retailer’s order
had been received. The distributors themselves ordered replacement
stock from the Allen Company every four to six weeks.
The company, for many years, maintained a policy of offering de
livery of all items from stock held in the company warehouse adjacent
to the plant. In practice this was not always possible, and an order
backlog usually existed during a seasonal demand peak. Whenever
the stock of any inventory item in the finished-goods warehouse
reached a low point, a requisition was sent to the production-control
office. Not all items requested could be scheduled immediately, how
ever, and the delay between the production request and the receipt of
new stock in the plant warehouse varied from five to fifteen days de
pending upon conflicting requirements for the machinery used to pro
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duce the item. Delivery from the plant warehouse to a distributor,
when an item was available from stock, required approximately four
days.
The Allen Company employed a sales force of two men who visited
distributors to inform them of new products, and sometimes accom
panied the distribution salesmen on their calls to retailers. Very little
was done to promote the product lines. Company calendars were de
livered to distributors to give to their retail customers, and some pointof-sale display materials were produced. No media advertising was
used, however, and management did not believe that any significant
degree of brand awareness existed for the products in which the com
pany specialized.
Miller’s Problem

Prior to Mr. Miller’s appointment, the production-control activity in
Allen appliances had operated without formal decision rules. All pro
duction requests were made by senior stores clerks whose judgment of
when an order should be placed and in what quantities was based
upon experience and recent distributor demand. The clerks attempted
to match the level of inventory to the current level of demand. There
fore, in periods immediately preceding a seasonal peak, the produc
tion requests exceeded the quantity required to replace units sold
and subsequently increased the basic inventory. In a slack season
however, production requests were less than the distributor demand,
thereby reducing the inventory which had been accumulated. No
formal procedures for the calculation of order quantities or safety
stock levels had been developed.
The seasonal nature of demand for Allen’s products, as exercised
through the medium of distributor demand, resulted in a highly un
stable level of production and employment. Additional staff was em
ployed during the “busy” season from August to December and laid off
during the slack season. Considerable overtime also resulted during
the months of October and December.
Mr. Miller later related:
“I was unhappy from the first day that I took this job about the way
the company was handling its inventory and production control,
largely because they were far too dependent upon the judgment and
experience of a few key people. I was also unhappy about the way the
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production level and employment fluctuated. Considerable time and
money was spent trying to train people who would only be employed
for a few months. This company had the reputation of being a ‘hire
and fire’ firm which meant that the majority of the people who came
to work here were the ones who couldn’t get any other job—the bottom
of the labor barrel. I wanted to establish some rational decision rules
and to adopt an inventory policy which would let us reduce the sea
sonal fluctuations in production to some extent and spread our work
load more evenly over the year.
“I am fairly conversant with the various inventory control tech
niques. I know how to calculate economic order quantities, how to
plan a fixed order quantity system and that sort of thing. The problem
is that one of the critical parameters in calculating batch sizes and
reorder points is the annual usage. The demand for most of our
products is so seasonal that it is hard to know what demand or usage
figure to use. Sure, I could use an ‘average’ figure but the amount of
variance is so great that I wonder if the figures we calculate would be
at all meaningful. Further, because the fluctuation is so great any
attempt to level out production over the year would obviously result
in massive fluctuations in the finished-goods inventory.
“Well, I had been trying to work out a compromise solution. One
idea was to recalculate the order quantity and safety stocks at differ
ent points in the year; say, use one set of parameters in the period
leading up to our peak demand and a different set during the slack
period. A further possibility was to smooth out production to some
extent without trying to level it altogether. There are all kinds of
possible combinations. I have also been trying to get a better idea of
just what the pattern of our sales fluctuations looks like—obviously we
have some kind of a long-term upward trend with a cycle acting
around that trend.
“That’s about as far as I got when this data came in.”
Results of the Survey

The management of the Allen Company had assumed that the fluc
tuations in retail sales were similar to those in distributor demand.
T his seemed to be a reasonable assumption, since retail sales were
the determinant of distributor demand. Again quoting Mr. Miller:
“Let me give you an idea of the extent of the fluctuations in demand
as we experience it from the distributors. Take a look at these figures.
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These are our total dollar sales, month by month, for the last full
year (1966).
January ............ .......... $226,000
February .......... .......... 224,000
March .............. .......... 206,176
April .................. .......... 176,000
May .................. .......... 144,000
June
.......... 127,000

......... $120,000
July
August ............... ......... 126,000
September ......... ......... 150,000
October ............. ......... 2lo,000
November ......... ......... 238,000
December ......... ......... 242,000

Total for year:

$2,195,000

Average monthly demand:

$183,000

I can best describe the degree of fluctuation in relation to average
monthly sales. We range from a high of 32 per cent above the monthly
average to a low of 34 per cent. And that is a pretty big fluctuation.
“Now look at these figures. These are the total monthly retail sales
of Allen products in our two hundred outlets during the same period:
January ....................... $178,000
February ..................... 176,000
March ......................... 175,000
April ............................. 172,000
May ............................. 164,000
June
156,000

J u ly ......................... ...... $164,000
August ................... ..... 170,000
September ............. ..... 179,000
October ....................... 193,000
November ................... 196,000
December ............ ...... 194,000

Total for year:

$2,117,000

Average monthly sales:

$176,000

“Two things immediately stand out. One is that total sales by re
tailers over the year were considerably lower than total replacement
demands on the factory placed by distributors. But this is not really
surprising: it simply means that we finished the year with quite a lot
of goods in the pipeline and in distributors’ and retailers’ inventories.
We know that their orders will now fall off as they use up this surplus
and draw their inventories down again.
“The second point is the thing that has rocked me back on my
heels. Contrary to all our assumptions, if these figures are to be be
lieved, retail sales of our products fluctuate very much less than
does demand on the factory warehouse. The high point of retail sales
was only 11 per cent above the monthly average; the worst month was
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only 11 per cent below. We have been assuming that our demand
from distributors is highly cyclical because retail sales are highly
cyclical, and suddenly I find that the retail sales of Allen products are
comparatively stable! I will have to do some thinking about that.”
Questions

1. W hat is happening in this company? How do you account for
the phenomena revealed in the survey data?
2. W hat further information would you like to have? How would
you go about getting it.
Allen Associates Obtain Outside Advice

Mr. Miller realized that the information revealed by the sample
was likely to have considerable significance for other areas within the
company, particularly the sales and production functions. At his re
quest a meeting of senior management was held under the chairman
ship of the company president, William Holland, to decide what should
be done. Miller suggested that this data was of basic importance to
planning the company’s operations and that management should en
sure its most effective use. There was general agreement on this point.
Mr. Holland then voiced the opinion that this was a situation in
which the company could use outside assistance. Allen Associates
enjoyed a good relationship with their CPA firm which conducted the
company’s annual audit. In the past, Allen Associates had engaged
their CPAs, Hartfiel, Vogel and Faber Co. to assist them on other mat
ters. Mr. Holland decided that Hartfiel, Vogel and Faber should be
invited to discuss this problem and to see what help they might be
able to provide.
Ernest Spell, a partner in the CPA firm’s advisory team, met with
Messrs. Holland and Miller early in the following week. Mr. Miller
outlined the situation, showed Spell the data on retail sales, and,
after some discussion, asked for his comments. Mr. Spell said:
“I appreciate your surprise at the relationship which is shown here,
but I don’t altogether share it. I have seen a number of studies with
a similar pattern. Clearly the demand from your distributors which
you experience at the factory warehouse must depend upon retail sales,
but the influence of retail sales is being exercised through a sort of
64

ALLEN APPLIANCES, INC.

multiplication factor. I think the answer may be in the way the
retailers decide how much inventory they want to hold. But you need
much more information before you can come to any conclusions. In
particular, I would like to know more about the pattern of retailers’
orders to distributors. All this may take time, but you will have a
much better idea of the dynamics underlying the demand for your
products. Once that information is attained, a solution would become
more apparent.”
Holland and Miller accepted Spell’s suggestion and asked him to
work with them on the problem. Spell instructed one of his assistants
to devote his time to Allen Appliances, and the collection of the addi
tional data was started. The company’s ten distributors were asked to
provide the company with data on the orders they received from
retailers throughout the year. In most cases, a total figure for orders
received for the week or month was available but did not show the
volume for Allen products separately. Most of the distributors were
willing to allow a representative of the company to have access to
their records. Subsequently, Spell’s assistant gathered data from four
of the larger distributors in different areas, and it was decided that
the figures obtained from them could be taken as a workable approxi
mation of the general pattern of retail ordering. Spell and his assist
ant also visited 25 of the company’s 200 retail outlets to talk to the
retailers about their reordering procedures, and obtained a good idea
of the methods used. The consultants and Mr. Miller’s staff spent two
further weeks analyzing the data they had obtained. A meeting with
Holland, Miller and the other department heads concerned was held
on the following week.
Spell Outlines His Findings

The results of the fact gathering activities and subsequent analysis
may be summarized by the following extracts from Spell’s presentation:
“We thought that it would be useful to get an idea of the pattern
of retailers’ orders, and we were right. The figures we have are an
approximation, but we think they are representative of what actually
happens. Now you can really start to see how this cyclical demand
builds up.
“I would like you to look at this chart. ( See Exhibit 1, page 66.)
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Exhibit 1

On it we have plotted the behavior of retail sales, retailers’ orders to
distributors and distributors’ orders to the factory for the year 1966.
As the chart shows, we have also plotted the various monthly totals
and then drawn smooth curves through them, as nearly as we could,
to show the general pattern. These curves show an interesting rela
tionship. Each level in the process shows a greater degree of cyclic
fluctuations than the one preceding it: retailers’ orders vary more than
retail sales and distributors’ orders to the factory vary more than re
tailers’ orders. Each level reaches its peaks and vales a little later in
time than the one preceding it.
“What is happening is this: there is a genuine cyclical pattern in
the retail sales of Allen products, but not a very great one—certainly
not as great as you have assumed it to be. This pattern is amplified
twice, however: once by the retailers themselves, and once by the
distributors. The result is that the demand you experience at the plant
warehouse is very cyclical.
“Now, the question is, how does this amplification of the cyclical
pattern arise? The answer seems to be in the way the retailers and
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distributors decide how much to order. We have spent quite some
time looking into this. Take a typical retailer. He does not have any
concept of economic order quantities. He uses a version of the fixed
order cycle system, not the fixed order quantity system: he reorders
when the distributor’s representative calls—a fairly constant cycle of
two weeks. He does have a decision rule, and his order is not simply
a replacement order. He tries to relate his inventory position—more
accurately, I suppose we should call it the safety stock element in his
inventory—to demand, and he does this by making his inventory at
the beginning of each period some multiple of current demand, as far
as he can judge it. In practice, that means a multiple of actual demand
experienced in the previous week
“It isn’t hard to see what happens. Suppose that a particular retailer
has a policy of keeping inventory equal to eight times current weekly
demand, and that in the past few weeks demand for Allen products
in his shops has been around $200 a week. His inventory of Allen
products will be approximately $1,600. Then, say, in the first week in
September he sells $210 of your products. Halfway through the fol
lowing week his distributor’s representative calls to take his order. In
the past few weeks he has been ordering $400 worth of stock: just
enough to replace what he has sold in two weeks. This time, he will
order replacement stock of $410, plus enough additional stock to bring
his inventory to eight times his new demand level. This level will now
be $1,680, an increase of $80. Thus an increase of $10 in retail sales
has resulted a week or so later in the retailer’s order to the distributor
increasing by $90. There is your amplification! A few months later
you go through the process in the opposite direction: the retailer’s
sales fall off and he finds himself with stock on hand equal to about
twenty times the new demand level. So, he probably orders no new
stock at all until he is back to his desired position with stock of around
eight times current demand.
“Much the same sort of thing is apparently happening at the dis
tributor level, and our inquiries suggest that their reordering rules are
no more sophisticated than those of the retailers. So the magnitude
of the change gets amplified again. And this time the amplification is
even greater because the distributor orders less frequently and because
the interval between placing an order and receiving stock is usually
greater for him than for the retailer. He normally already has a num
ber of orders outstanding with you—in the pipeline, you might say—
and will probably increase his order even more to fill up that pipeline.
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When demand falls off, you again go through the same process except
in reverse.”
Deciding Upon a Plan of Action

Following Mr. Spell’s presentation, the group discussed what mea
sures might be taken. As Mr. Miller later said:
“We knew that the big seasonal cyclic fluctuations were costing us
money as well as giving us headaches, and we certainly didn’t intend
to go on living with it if we could do anything about it. Now that we
know what is causing the cycle, or rather intensifying it, it should be
possible to do something about it.”
Based on Mr. Spell’s findings, the management group decided that
there were three basic ways in which they could seek to change the
situation. These were:
1. Eliminate one of the levels in the ordering process. This would
automatically eliminate the amplification effect associated with
that level.
2. Try to modify the pattern of retail demand by means of marketing
policies.
3. Persuade the retailers and distributors to modify their reorder
policies.
The first possibility, eliminating one level in the system, could be
achieved in either of two different ways. The Allen Company could
decide to eliminate distributors and to supply retail outlets directly
from the company warehouse. This would have required the creation
of a much larger company sales force. Management felt that the rela
tively small volume of sales per retailer would make this uneconomical,
and that the establishment and training of such a force would be a
lengthy process. The second possibility was to establish a chain of
company-owned retail outlets. This latter possibility was considered
to be completely uneconomical and impossible to finance and was
also rejected.
The second possible approach to try to smooth out the seasonal
fluctuations by means of increased promotional efforts, advertising,
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increased distribution discounts, etc., during the off-peak period was
given serious consideration but was ultimately rejected. The types of
product made by the Allen Company were not items to which brand
loyalty was usually attached and it was decided that advertising ex
penditure would not be rewarding. The possibility of offering in
creased margins to distributors at certain times was opposed by the
sales department which considered it to be an undesirable policy to
adopt, principally because it would be difficult to withdraw the extra
discounts, when the peak demand period arrived, without causing
resentment and allegations of bad faith.
The remaining possible line of approach appeared to be the most
promising. Much of the amplification of the sales cycle arose'because
of retailer and distributor ordering procedures, and if those procedures
could be modified it might be possible to minimize the amplification.
This approach required little in the way of expenditures and was con
sidered to be very diplomatic. The remaining question was what
decision rule should they be asked to adopt. Mr. Miller said after
wards:
“We wanted to find a rational basis for the retailers’ and distributors’
inventory policies, and we were certain that we could eliminate the
surging which had been taking place. We realized, though, that we
must not try to sell them anything too static. Changes in demand do
take place, both the seasonal cycle and a long-term upwards trend,
and they must obviously be free to respond to these changes. The
problem was to ensure that they did not respond too quickly. The
established pattern of visits by distributors’ representatives made it
reasonable to assume that the retailers should continue to use a fixed
order cycle system. Under this system there is an upper inventory
level, and enough stock is ordered on each cycle to bring the inventory
to this level. It was also reasonable to assume that this upper inven
tory level would be related in some way to sales and would change in
response to changes in sales.
“We decided that what we required was a way of damping the
response to these changes: spreading them over a reasonable period of
time instead of putting them into effect all at once. We therefore
asked the retailers to use their previous decision rules and to continue
using their own ideas concerning what multiple of current sales their
inventories should be. However, we requested that whenever a
change in inventory level was indicated that the change be spread
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over the next four reorder periods instead of just one. The adjustment
would thus be spread over two months. W hat happens then, is this:
say that a retailer’s sales have recently been steady at $200 a week
and then increase to $210, and say that he works on an inventory of
eight times weekly sales. The sales increase indicates an increase in
total inventory of $80, b u t this is spread over four reorder periods.
Therefore at the next reorder time, this retailer’s order will be replace
ment demand of $410 plus $20 of new inventory, a total of $430 (see
page 67). Under the old system it would have been $490, as you can
see from this chart (Exhibit 2, page 71).
“The system we have introduced at the distribution level is very
similar. I suppose you could argue that there is less reason to use a
fixed order cycle system in this case and that we could have explored
the use of a fixed order quantity system with them, but we didn’t do
that. The fixed order cycle approach works well because we supply
them with a whole range of different items, and if we receive orders
for all the items at the same time we can average deliveries at the
lowest possible cost. An even more important consideration, though,
was that we believed that our best chance of getting the cooperation
of the distributor was to change things as little as possible. The
‘damping’ idea we introduced wasn’t too great a departure from what
they were already doing and we didn’t have too much trouble getting
them to go along with us.
“The changes we have made seem successful. We do not yet have
the full 1967 figures available to us, but we do know that sales fell off
much more slowly during June and July than they have in previous
years. The lowest monthly sales figure came in August this year, not
July, and was $136,000, compared with our 1966 low of $120,000. And
the indications seem to be that the damping is working equally well in
the current peak sales period. I can now start concentrating upon
the implications of all this for our own plant inventory and production
policies, and I intend to make use of Mr. Spell’s services again in this
area.”
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Exhibit 2

Retailer's Response to Sales Increase from $200 to $210
Per Week Occurring in Week 5

New System
Using "Damping"
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